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"The Germans are coming:" In the mid-1880's, that was an anxious cry
where Australian and New zealand businessmen were concerned. They were
familiar with Theodor Weber, the "South Sea King" and his "Long-Handle
Firm," the Deutsche Handels-und plantagengesellschaft zu Sudsee Inseln
Hamburg (DHPG). Its trading stations were spread throughout the Pacific
from the Tuamotu Islands to New Guinea, and its ships carried a
significant portion of the European trade in the pacifc. By then Weber
and his German proteges had gained a reputation as tough and calculating
merchants, not only with their competitors but with the Islanders as well.
Land acquis i tions in the Samoa Islands and New Guinea for copra
plantations, gained legally or through confiscation by the these
merchants, inevitably led to disputes with Islanders. Land once "sold" to
the white rran was difficult to reclaim, and anirosities on the part of
both German merchant and Islanders continued to simmer, occasionally
leading to violence and bloodshed. Passive and active resistance on the
part of the Islanders led to a call for assistance and protection from the
rother country by the German traders and planters. SOOn the islanders
found German warships at their shores demanding guarantees of friendship
or warning of retaliation for misdeeds against the German Empire's loyal
and prosperous subjects. When politics did not go the latter's way, they
sought to rrake politics work to their advantage, either by tacit support
of the opposition or by direct interference.
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Land ownership to the Islanders was important, but no less so to the
Germans, who required law and order and security of property for their
financial prosperity. In Germany, the merchants were supported by a very
vocal minority favoring acquistion of colonial territories and eXPansion
of the Empire into Africa and the pacific.
Eventually the vocal minorities and their support within the Imperial
government were politically powerful enough to create the conditions
favorable for colonial acquisitions. Bismarck, steadfastly cautious
about colonial endeavors, reversed his attitudes about colonial
acquisition in 1884 and 1885 to declare protectorates in Africa, the
Marshall Islands and New Guinea. He returned to his previous policies
thereafter, which his successor, Caprivi, maintained. However, Kaiser
Wilhelm II chose to exhibit and maintained a more aggressive attitude
toward territorial acquisiton until the beginning of World War Ie At the
turn of the century, turmoil in Samoa combined with the defeat of the
Spanish to give the German merchants the security and stable colonial
government they required and Kaiser Wilhelm the remaining territory of
Micronesia that he wanted.
For rrost of the fifteen years remaining of German Colonial Rule in
New Guinea, Samoa and Micronesia, the administrators had difficulty just
keeping the peace. The turnoil, which the Germans experienced from the
outset, did not end with colonial acquisition. The government could not
totally pacify or sUbjugate the Islanders. Their resistance continued
pressure on the colonial administrators until foreign occupation of
German Pacific territories as result of World War I.
-3-
'This paper intends to review events and factors which gave rise to
and shaped German policy in the pacific. It traces the foundations for
German entry into the Pacific, the wellspring of colonial aspirations and
the methods by which acquisitions were effected. Its major purpose is to
define the policies of the German colonial participants and government
which were in force before and after formal annexation. The native
response to German activities, though not often found in print, can be




ORIGINS OF GERMAN COLONIAL POLICY
EARLY COLONIAL ASPlRATICNS
The foundation of German colonial policy in the Pacific lies with
institutions developed as early as the twelfth century A.D. The concept
of the "Charter Company", employed in German New Guinea and the Marshall
Islands in the late nineteenth century, as a means for commercial
development of an area and the use of its administration as a political
arm of the government are first encountered in the German "Hansa" or
merchant association. The Hansa rrerchants established centers of trade
in the Baltic where they obtained trading rights and concessions from
feudal lords. They gradually penetrated the cormnerce of these countries
by acquiring freedom from customs and native laws, but most importantly
they were able to obtain favorable trading positions with the
establishment of their "factories," a concept which was also integral to
the Pacific trade seven hundred years later (Townsend: 9).
with the advancement of the Age of Exploration, circa 1500, the North
German Hansa towns took a "lively interest in the portuguese discoveries
and the Hansa sent many of its vessels by the new waterways in search of
cormnerce from the East." As 63.rly as 1503 the German towns of Nuremburg
and Augsburg, led by the Welser firm, formed a commercial establishment
at Lisbon which developed into a large trading company and won rights
from the King of portugal to visit the East Indies. "King Dom Emanuell
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gave the German company the right of precedence in the Indian trade, and
authorized a company charter permitting German merchants to establish
their own courts in Lisbon" (Townsend: 12). The company failed due to
portuguese trader reaction and lack of support from a national government
or authority.
For the next twenty-five years the German firms attempted to
penetrate the Spanish network of corrnnerce without success. However, in
1528 the opportunity arose to colonize and govern Venezuela in South
America in exchange for a large loan to King Charles V of Spain. The
Welser firm governed the colony for thirty years but lost it due to
strife with the Indians and SPaniards, financial mismanagement and,
again, the lack of national support (Townsend: 13).
During this period of exploration, the Hohenzollerns, upon whom the
control of the Hanseactic League fell, were alert to the prospects
afforded them. According to Friedrich Wilhelm, the Great Elector and
Prussian King, "trade and corrnnerce are the most important foundations of
the state." Seven years after his succession to leadership, he tried to
form an East India Company but was thwarted in his aims by war with
Sweden in 1647. In 1650, he purchased Tranquebar and Fort Danesberg on
the southeast coast of India from Denmark, built up a small navy in 1666
and sent out an expedition to "reconnoiter" the Guinea coast • As a
result of these activities, the Great Elector established a protectorate
on the Gold Coast and subsequently chartered the African Corrnnercial
Company to which he gave a monopoly (Townsend: 14,15).
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The Great Elector, distracted by ambitions of rronarchy, let his
colonies wither. His successor, Frederick Wilhelm II, attempted to
transfer the African Company's rights to the East India Company and to
maintain the colony, but his attempts were unsuccessful. Thereafter, the
Hohenzollerns endeavored to continue the earlier initiative. Alrrost one
hundred years later in 1750, a revival of the spir it was seen with
Frederick the Great's rroves to charter an Asiatic Company based at
Emden. It prospered for a few years but failed. He later tried
unsuccessfully to revive the Asiatic Company in 1775. "Prussia's efforts
thus ended in 1775, so far as any material results could demonstrate, and
her aims and ambitions far outstripped her achievements. Nevertheless,
the early Hohenzollerns contributed the idea if not the successful
practice of a state-directed commercial and colonial policy to Germany's
historical tradition" (Townsend: 16).
The Hohenzollerns lost their overseas territory for various reasons.
The Great Elector gave up territory and his stations in India for lack of
funds. 'Ihe Dutch, along with the French, continually harrassed the
Guinea coast. The African Company consistently required subsidies and
Frederick Wilhelm II, eventually in need of rroney, ceded all Prussian
interests for a small indemnity. The ravages of the Thirty Years War at
hone played a decisive role, as distant colonies represented a financial
burden for a nation that required rebuilding. At the beginning of the
Nineteenth Century, the notion of colonization was considered impractical
by Frederick Wilhelm III, as a result of the Napoleonic Wars and German
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Revolution at horne (Townsend: 28). European politics precluded adoption
of any real colonial policy during the early years of the 19th century.
The Congress of Vienna offered Russia little flexibility, either, for the
Germanic Confederation was hardly the vehicle by which it could leap to a
position of world-power status. The Confederation, created by the
Congress of Vienna, was yet a politically and economically weak
agglomeration of small states with an unarticulated policy, dominated by
Austria and supported in its conservative policies by Russia. M::>reover,
it was both financially and militarily impotent to take over the reigns
of a colonial policy; initiative would have to be left to private
entrepreneurs (Townsend: 23).
THE GERMAN POPULIST MOVEMENT
After the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars favorable conditions arose
for acquiring possessions. According to Mary Evelyn Townsend, "not only
were conditions ripe externally for a vigorous colonial expansion, but
internally a change had swept over the German people, awakening them,
broadening their horizon, and making them eager for adventure and
discovery. Since the War of Liberation and the invigoration of a new
national consciousness, they felt themselves to be rrore Germans than
Prussians, than Bavarians or Saxons. The urge for national expansion
experienced by the English, the French and the Dutch during the sixteenth
and the seventeenth centuries was now beginning to be felt tardily by the
Germans in the nineteenth century" (Townsend: 31).
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The first indications of a populist movement for colonial acquisition
arose among intellectuals. Historians, like Treitschke and Droipen,
urged expansion through the taking of territory. As early as 1812,
Heeren wrote that colonies should be an integral part of the state. In
the German Diet, representatives in 1817 recommended colonies to stem the
tide of out-migration to other countries (Townsend: 33). By the 1840' s
political economists like Roscher and Wappaus preached colonization.
They were led by Friedrich List who urged colonization in his book,
National Systems of Political Economy. His writings remained a
"cornerstone" of a long line of proindustrial and protectionist thinking
which advocated the theory of a central customs union (Smith: 12). Noted
naturalist Alexander von Humbolt, although against colonies, created
supporting propaganda from his accounts of travel and research. A
multitude of publications describing far-off lands and travel were
available by the mid-1850's. Gottfried Duden's Travel Through the
Western States of North America "touched off a veritable fever" for
imrrdgration to Missouri (Townsend: 35).
Townsend contends that these voluminous publications created a
colonial cul t theory. "Never can it be said of Germany, as it is often
said of Great Britain, that she built up her colonial empire in a 'fit of
absence of mind'. For while it may be an English characteristic to
construct a policy, post facto, it is equally a German habit to formulate
a priori an abstract theory as a guide to practice" (Townsend: 36).
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Encouragement of emigration for colonization began as early as 1817.
From 1817 to 1826, annual emigration averaged 6,000 people. Between the
years 1830-1844 emigration was estirrated at 22,000 annually, rising to
66,000 for the years 1856 through 1860 • The restructuring of German
agriculture had caused the rrassive cycles of emigration and the change in
structure also influenced many other occupational groups to emigrate due
to dislocation from industrialization throughout the nineteenth century
(Smith: 10). The year 1872 experienced the greatest emigration out of
Germany when 128,000 people left the country. After this intense period
of emigration, the movement declined precipitously as the German
industrial machine became an importer of labor (Townsend: 10).
This was a period of an ever-rising tide of emigration to the
Americas. Settlers' spirits were high. Germans that settled in Texas
were pressing for annexation of the Mexican Territory before it could be
taken by the United States. BJ.nsen, the Prussian Minister to England,
had also urged Bisrrarck to seize Mexico and California. He ftdid his best
to persuade Frederick Wilhelm IV to accept Mexico's offer to sell
California to Prussia in 1842. The plan included a canal to be cut
through Panarra and a gradual assimilation of Oregon and the Trans-Rocky
Mountain region, but needless to state, none of it was ever realizedft
(Townsend: 40).
During this period of emigration, various influences were pushing for
a German stake in colonial development. The Deutsche Kolonial-
gesellschaft was established in 1842 to create a series of private
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colonies around the world. The Chatham settlement in New Zealand was its
first endeavor. The German nobility were also interested in the
possibility of a new feudal state in North America which would profit off
the peasantry. The gold rushes of California and Australia created
another fervor of excitement. As a result, several societies were set up
to control the flow and destination of emigration and to foster
nationalism. Forerrost arrong them were the Nationalverein fur Deutsche
Auswanderung und Ansiedlung und the Berlin Verein zur Centralisation
Deutsche Auswanderung und Kolonisation, organized in 1849 (Townsend: 42).
The missionary societies came to influence German nationalism and
colonial developrrent, also. At least eight strong societies had been
founded to work abroad by 1870. The largest were the Barmen Rhine
Mission, the Brerren Mission and the Bassler Mission. In the 1860 IS,
German missionaries had founded stations in New Guinea, the Marshall
Islands and Sarroa. The impact of the missionary organizations is rrost
impressive because "they crystallized into societies which became active
centers of agitation for national expansion. "Felix Fabri, a powerful
religious leader of the times, came to playa major role in the push for
further expansion late in the century" (Townsend: 44).
THE TRADERS ENHANCE THE POPULIST MOVEMENT FOR COLONIES
The populist rrovement was instrumental in creating a fervor for
overseas expansion, but it was the commercial trading companies that were
the most effective in putting Germany physically on the map. The
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destruction of the Zollverein in 1834 and an improvement in sea
transportation made it possible for the old Hansa towns of Hamburg,
Lubeck and Bremen to rise to prominence again. The 1830' s through the
1860' s saw enormous energy devoted to corrunercial development in remote
areas. Africa had become a new frontier and trade grew steadily with the
placement of Hansa "factories" along the west and southwest coast of
Africa (Townsend: 46).
'!he surge of cOll1lTercial activity by the Hansa in the 1830' s was
carried to the Pacific islands in the 1840's. The Hamburg firm of Johann
Cesar Godeffroy and Son had created a trading network of stations that
extended fran South America to Cochin China. "Fran Valparaiso, the
Godeffroys had begun the penetration of polynesia by first supplying the
French garrison of Tahiti; then by developing the briefly flourishing
pearl shell fisheries of the Tuarrotus" (Fox: 137). Their center of
operations were moved to Apia, in the Samoa Islands, in the mid-1850's,
from which they consolidated the copra trade and became the rrost
successful firm in the pacific. In 1871, Theodor Weber, the firm's
manager, added New Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago to its sphere of
influence. By the mid-1880's, German trade extended to the Marshall
Islands and to Matupit of New Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago. An
estimated fifty German ships traded with Samoa and the Tonga Islands and
carried at least fifty percent of all trade with the area (Townsend:
49). Already established were stations in the Fiji's, plantations in the
Tonga Islands and thirty-six trading stations throughout the Pacific area.
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'The activities of the Godeffroys were brought home to the German
people in 1861, when the House of Godeffroy founded the Godeffroy Museum
and exhibited naterials from the cultures of the Pacific. TO publicize
activities, Godeffroys also published the Journal des Museum Godeffroys
from 1871 to 1879 (Townsend: 49).
BISMARCK STRESSES CAUTION IN COLONIAL ACQUISITION
After 1848, Prussia concentrated on strengthening its military
stature. The Prussian government was not concerned with immigration to
colonial areas, nor had it the mind to involve itself in colonial
intrigues. The elite of the Hanseatic cities did not want to upset the
English and the industrialists were not interested in costly risks. NOr
did any major interest group support colonialization at the time (Smith:
5) • The rrerchants were prospering in Africa and it was important to
maintain stability at hane. An aggressive attitude toward developing
colonies would have to wait some thirty years.
Fran 1866 to 1871 Germany irrunersed itself in internal unification,
which was led by the powerful nobility of the Prussian state. At that
time, the prospect of colonial acquisition became a public issue and was
effectively used as campaign naterial by contesting parties. Bismarck,
however, publicly shunned colonization, but allowed his mouthpiece, the
Norddeutsche Allgemeine zeitung, to rally support for the colonial cause
(Smith: 6).
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The early 1870 's saw a resurgence of the colonial spirit. Men like
Treitschke, who had early written of colonial conquest, and von Weber
advocated the annexation of African areas and islands in the Pacific.
Das Kleine Journal and Die Welt post, mouthing jingoistic slogans,
advocated taking New Guinea, Fiji and the New Hebrides. Support for a
colonial policy was even found with the Navy, as colonial development
would spur naval development.
It was, however, the economic crisis of 1873 that led to or
influenced further eXPansion outside Germany as a means for recuperating
financially. The depression was characterized by falling profits,
sluggish demand and strong international competition in Europe. The
market decline led commerce and industry to call for tariff protection
and expanded markets outside Germany. The new Central Verband deutscher
Industrieller, organized to lobby in favor of protection and
concentration of foreign investment in oversees markets, was established
at mid-decade to deal with the problem. This organization mirrored the
attitudes of the famous economist of mid-decade, Friedrich List. He had
become the ideological prophet for the period, and his theories were "the
primary theoretical voice of industrial progress, protection, and the
direct attachment of an industrial Germany to her own exclusive markets
and sources of raw materials" (smith: 13).
As the trade grew in the pacific, a greater need or, at least ,
desire for naval protection was often suggested. Not all supported this
view. Except for Albrecht and Livonius, most of the ruling class
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"did not possess sufficient sympathy, understanding and imagination to
awreciate the movement for colonies" (Townsend: 58). Their motivation
after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was to strengthen their internal
resources, preserve a tenuous friendship with England and attain security
for Germany at home. The prevailing "laissez-faire doctrine" of the time
also worked to discourage colonial expansion by government, when all went
so well for private enterprise.
Aside from a minority that had supported colonialism and were
becoming increasingly vocal, it cannot be said that the new Germany was
alert to the advantages of colonialism. The number of actual colonial
enthusiasts who joined or supported organizations was fairly small and
limited to certain sections of the middle class. As previously noted,
some real disadvantages to colonization were especially seen by the upper
classes. During the first five years of the Reich, Bismarck showed a
decided unwillingness to become involved in colonial entanglements. In
1871, he refused France's offer to colonies as a form of reparation, over
the objections of the jingoistic opposition. Bismarck rejected
enumerable petitions to take territories and to set up naval stations in
China and Samoa. He claimed that the Empire possessed neither men nor
rroney to support such a venture. with regard to sarroa, he reprimanded
Stuebel, his Consul in Apia, for suggesting annexation and advised him to
"avoid any friction with the United States, to be tactful, and to promote
no independent policy" (Townsend: 66).
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Bismarck's reasons were sound. He realized that the Empire was not a
world power and that it made no sense to excite the antagonisms of the
major powers. Bismarck realized that if Germany sought expansion
overseas it v.ould have to be in cooperation with Great Britain. It has
even been alleged by some writers that Bismarck approached Great Britain
to arrange a modus vivendi, but the notion has been rejected by united
Kingdom scholars (Townsend: 67). Bismarck was also engrossed with
centralizing the regime and embroiled in the Kulturkampf. And after all,
it appeared that there was a lack of support among the general public for
colonization and stiff opposition in the Reichstag.
It is later in the decade that Bismarck accepts the premise that
Germany must foster colonialism abroad to secure and maintain a position
of supremacy in Europe (Townsend: 62). When he broke, in 1878, with the
National Liberal party, staunch opponents of colonialism, he began to
discretely pursue a policy of expansion (Townsend: 68). He did tread
warily, for he recognized that "a great nation like Germany could not, in
the end, diSPense with colonies. He hesitated to embark upon colonializa-
tion without adequate preparation and a definite impulse from the nation
itself" (Townsend: 68).
In the years 1876 and 1879, he instructed his naval commandant to
establish treaties with Tonga and Samoa. The Tongan treaty "guaranteed
reciprocal commercial freedom and the right to establish a naval station
at Vava'u." The Samoan treaty was the result of Germany's desire to
protect the commercial interests of Godeffroys, jeopordized by the civil
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war between claimants to the "kingship" of the islands. It gave trading
advantage to Germany, and also "ceded to Germany rights which the Samoan
government is forbidden to grant to any other nation as well as the right
to establish a coaling station on the island of Upolu" (Townsend: 70).
Germany also made other treaties with the Ellice and Gilbert Islands, the
Marshall Islands, and islands in the Duke of York group of the Bismarck
Archipelago. But Bismarck made quite an effort to play down the
importance of the treaties, justifying them as a basis for protection of
German business and denying any interest in colonial territory. He
printed the clarification in the Deutscher Reichs Anzeiger, as a measure
of assurance for the major powers. Nevertheless, by 1879, along with
England and the United States, he was willing to establish a joint
municipal protectorate over the town of Apia on Upolu (Townsend: 71).
PRESSURE BUILDS FOR AN AGGRESSIVE COLONIAL POLICY
Bismarck's economic policies were seen to change in the latter half
of the 1870' s. The dismissal of his Minister of Commerce, Rudolph von
Delbruch, and the repudiation of his "free-trade" policies represented a
new course for the Chancellor. In 1879, he established a schedule of
protective tariffs, which was a key factor in the development of the
oversees Empire later. The pressure to develop such policies came from
his support in the Reichstag and in the private sector, an alliance of
big Prussian agriculture and big industry (Smith: 15). Bismarck's switch
from free trade policies also signalled that a new ideal for national
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economics was installed in the ruling class.
The failure of the House of Godeffroy rrarked a turning point in
Bisrrarck's attitude toward colonial involvement. Prior to 1870, Bisrrarck
as the Chancellor of prussia, expressed his encouragement to Weber of
Godeffroys that Samoa be a place of German immigration and that he would
support the company with arms and send a warship to protect the trade.
The scheme was interrupted by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and put off
for later consideration (Townsend: 66). By 1880, the whole picture had
changed, virtually overnight. The House of Godeffroys had over-reached
itself in 1878 as a result of mining speculation in Europe and was
compelled to borrCM money from Baring Brothers of London to keep itself
solvent. Nonetheless, it failed in 1879 (Townsend: 72).
Bisrrarck wanted to underwrite the firm in order to fend off British
or foreign takeover. He proposed a bill for that purpose to the
Reichstag to maintain international stature and avoid losing Gerrrany's
strong commercial interests in Samoa. "Prompted by Godeffroy and by von
Hansemann, the head of the Diskonto Gesellschaft and his brother-in-law
von Kusserow, the Auswartiges Arnt counselor for overseas affairs, the
German government announced its intention of guaranteeing a four and
one-half percent dividend for twenty years of a new company, the Deutsche
Seehandels-Gesellschaft" (Kennedy: 22).
The Subsidy Bill became a test case for Bismarck's foreign policy and
a crucial factor for future imperial designs. The opposition ripped into
-18-
his program in the Reichstag and "tore off the disguise of national glory
and proclaimed the Bill an inauguration of state-directed colonialism."
The Subsidy Bill failed and it proved to him that it was unwise to
initiate a colonial policy. Beaten but not down, he fell back to the
position he had taken a decade earlier; that one should advance no policy
without first having popular support. Moreover, it was the early 1880' s
and his supporters were none too numerous; he did not choose to struggle
against parties that could damage his fiscal policy and Social Insurance
Legislation in the Reichstag (Townsend: 74,75).
After the Subsidy Bill defeat, he rejected a number of roves by
private parties to acquire colonies, but he attempted, without success,
to set up an economic council which would appropriate funds for
government acquisition of territories. For a while he left the subject
cool and outside lobbyists to their awn means of whipping up public fever.
Several prominent individuals and groups again came into the struggle
in favor of colonization. Wilhelm Hubbe-Schleiden, a lawyer, explorer,
national politician and publicist, can be credited with elevating the
controversy to the level of national scrutiny. Hubbe-Schleiden' s
theorized that "colonies were necessary to prevent the degeneration of
the German PeOple through industrialization and the sapping of Germany's
strength through emigration" (Smith: 24). The economic side of the
question of "life and death" for Germany was exploited to a feverish
pitch by Felix Fabri, founder of the Westdeutsche Verein fur Kolonisation
und Export (Townsend: 78,80). Although he was the Inspector of the
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Barmen Rhine Mission, he brought together both influencial cornmericial
and relig ious spokesmen. In retropspect, his voice was not lost upon
Bismarck (smith: 21).
Advocates from trading interests formed the Central Verein fur
Handels Geographie und deutsche Interesse in Ausland in the mid-1870's.
It was the precursor of the Kolonialverein and the Deutsche Kolonial-
gesellschaft and, called for an aggressive export offensive. The majJr
interest group which entered the forum was the Kolonialverein, which was
established in 1882 by leaders of the colonial movement. with its
official publication, the Kolonial zeitung, it participated in an attack
upon the progressive and Center Parties of the Reichstag and against the
retrenchment policies of Bismarck (smith: 22).
Carl Peters, a young, well-educated and engaging individual, founded
the Gesellschaft fur deutsche Kolonisation and became the leading
advocate of colonialism in Germany. His organization became the first of
its kind to acquire property and establish a private colony. His
organization and the Kolonialverein merged in 1887 and became the
Kolonialgesellschaft, the only major colonial organization to continue to
operate up to and through World War Ie
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BISMARCK INAUGURATES THE COLONIAL EMPIRE
During 1884, Bismarck felt that he no longer need subordinate his
colonial policy in order to maintain harmony in his relationship with
Great Britain. previously his foreign policy reflected the need to steer
clear of any shON of antagonism toward England. By 1884, the terms had
grown rrore favorable for an aggressive German colonial policy: in 1883,
Germany's security in Europe was assured and he had improved his position
with France by means of the Triple Alliance of 1881.
Bismarck began his pressure on England by harking back to reparation
claims of German planters who were dispossessed by the British annexation
of Fi ji in 1874. Initial claims by the German planters had been ignored
by England since 1875, for the British failed to appreciate the German
case. In April, 1883, the British Colonial Office refused to comply with
Bismarck's request for recognition of the problem. Furthermore, the
Colonial Office felt that the two powers had no common ground on which to
negotiate. The British felt even rrore secure because of assurances from
the French of non-intervention in New Guinea. with British refusal,
Bismarck became even rrore furious and willing to force cooperation
(Knight: 65-70). He steadfastly pushed the issue and demanded a joint
commission of English and German participants to settle the problem. The
Commission, however, was seated only after arrangements over the
partition of claimed territories by Germany and Britain had been resolved
in 1885.
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RBut it was in Africa that Bismarck pushed his confident nationalism
policy; a climax which, in conjunction with affairs in the South pacific,
that created an international crisis and precipitated an outburst of
German patriotism strong enough to launch a state-directed colonial
policyR (Townsend: 83). The Anglo-French Convention and Anglo-portugese
Treaty of early 1884, which respectively partitioned the Congo,
established high customs duties and monopolistic control by the English.
It caused bitter antagonism of German interests in Africa, prompted an
enraged public outcry in Germany, and enabled Bismarck to seize upon a
long awaited opportunity. He requested France to join him in
condemnation of the British moves, and the French agreed to unite their
commercial interests with those of Germany in the Congo. In April 1884,
he placed the Luderitz factory in Southwest Africa under German Imperial
protection (Townsend: 87,88). Thus he created the German Colonial Empire.
While events were building to a crisis in Africa, similar incidents
were driving Bismarck closer to annexation of Pacific territories.
Letters fran his consuls, Dr. Oskar Stuebel and Franz Hernsheim, warned
of impinging commercial interests of Australia upon German business as
early as 1881. The matter began to grow in intensity as the Australians
becarre rrore vocal in their press and parliament against the intrusion of
Germany in their sphere-of-influence.
Both Stuebel and Hernsheim wrote Bismarck in early August of 1883
that Australia had RprovisionallyR annexed New Guinea. In fact, it was
Sir Thomas McIlwraith, Premier of Queensland, Australia, that instructed
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the police magistrate of Thursday Island to proceed to Port Moresby and
proclaim the area in the name of the Queen. The British Colonial Office
repudiated his proclamation on the basis that annexation was an Imperial,
not a colonial, power and that Germany offered no threat to its security
(Grattan: To 1900; 493,494).
In the light of the Australian roves, Hernsheim feared that any
interference with the labor trade by Australia would ruin his business.
Weber, also on August 6, 1883, warned Bismarck of the impending
Australian move and its potential damage to DHPG operations. "An
annexation of these islands v.Duld prevent the Company from procuring
laborers there and as no other islands in the south Sea could make up for
the deficiency, the existence of oor plantations on Sarroa v.Duld be
jeopardiZed. If Samca itself were annexed by one of these powers, German
interests v.Duld cease to exist altogether"
(premier's Office: 33).
The Intercontinental Conference of December 1883 in Sydney passed the
following resolution:
That in the 0plnlon of this convention no purchases or
pretended purchases of land made before the establishment
of British jurisdiction or dominion in New Guinea or the
other islands of the Pacific not having a recognized
government, should be acknowledged, except in respect to
small areas of land actually occupied for missionary or
trading practices (premier's Office: 35).
upset by the turn of events, both Godeffroy, now Director of the DHPG,
and Hernsheim wrote to Bismarck in January 1884 to "take measures to
secure to the German houses the possession of the land which they have
purchased, or may purchase in the future" (premier's Office: 35).
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Bisrrarck pressed the English Foreign Minister, Lord Granville, in
April of 1883 for an explanation and again sought to resolve the issue of
reparation payments (Townsend: 87). At the same time, Bismarck pressed
the English on the labor recuiting problem and for damages suffered by
German merchants as a result of the actions of Australian labor recruters
in 1883 (Knight: 66).
'!he issue of the labor trade was settled in haste by Griffith, a
Foreign Service Officer for the British, who paid indemnities to the
German merchants. He recognized the danger of the labor trade and its
clashes upon a stable foreign relationship (Knight: 66). However, the
payment of reparations to the Fiji traders was still not close to
settlement. Granville, at the head of the Foreign Office, did not want
to oppose Bismarck and pledged to "re-examine" and refer them to a mixed
corrnnission. on the other hand, Granville received opposition on this
issue from the British Colonial Office which failed to understand the
significance of the issue and was not prepared to come to terms with
Bisrrarck.
A mst important and eventful communication was received by Bismarck
from Adolph von Hansemann in late June of 1884. Von Hansemann notified
Bismarck that he had instructed Captain Finsch, a German explorer, to
surreptitiously establish settelments in New Guinea on behalf of the
DHPG, and he requested Bisrrarck to support the venture (premier's Office:
refer Awendix letter #19). In a letter to Bismarck of JUly 1884,
Stuebel again recorrunended to Bisrrarck that he not allow the British or
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Australians annexation of either the islands north of New Britain or the
northern coast of New Guinea.
June through December characterized a period of Anglo-German
estrangement. In June of 1884, the British were not prepared for
Bismarck's aggressive actions. His willingness to unite the Egyptian
issue with the Fi ji issue caught the Foreign and Colonial Offices off
guard. Q1. June 15, 1884, Granville suspended action on German
canplaints. Consequently, Plessen, Bismarck's emissary, delivered two
personal messages to Granville on September 23rd. Their content rust
have promised potentially damaging results, for the latter led the
British Cabinet to limit its protectorate to the south coast of New
Guinea, which they proclaimed on October, 23, 1884.
In early August, Granville and Munster met and held preliminary talks
in order to facilitate an agreement on their respective areas of
interests in the pacific. Q1. August 9, 1884, Count Munster informed
Bismarck that he broached the issue with Lord Granville and Lord
Granville assured him that an arrangement could be made. nHe was glad of
these colonial efforts of Germany and hoped a friendly agreement
respecting them might be arrived at n (premier's Office: 42). Thereafter,
the German and British governments entered into negotiations with respect
to the partition of the islands, after their mutual benefit.
Taking advantage of the entente with the British, Bismarck notified
von oerzten, his Imperial Commissioner in New Britain nto hoist the flag
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in the archipelago of New Britain and along that part of the northeast
coast of New Guinea" on August, 19, 1884. A day later he notified von
Hansemann that "instructions have been given to support your
undertaking. The acquisition made by you will be placed under the
protection of the Empire" (Premier's Office: 42). In mid-september Lord
Granville notified Bismarck of his intentions to resolve the Fiji issue.
Meade, Granville's emissary, presented the German Foreign Office with
a scheme " for a general settlement of all colonial questions affecting
the two countries" (Knight: 74). It was rost significant, because it
propose:l that France obtain territory in the New Hebrides. Busch, the
German Foreign Ambassador to England, responded to Meade, "any
arrangement which embraced the Pacific would have to be in some degree of
a tri-partite nature, as France has claims which lMJuld have to be
considered" (Knight: 77). In any case, French interests were not
interfering with those of Germany in the Pacific. Then on December 23,
1884, Bismarck officially announced his protectorate over northeast New
Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, refered to at the time as New
Britain.
Later the British and Germans lMJuld settle the boundary issues. The
Germans were given a "free hand, up to the level of establishing
protectorates, to the north of New Guinea west of the Gilbert Islands.
Samoa was declared to be a separate matter, since it was affected by
treaties with the united states as well as Germany and Britain. TOnga
and Niue, affected by German and English treaties, were declared neutral
territory" (Grattan:To 1900, 496-497).
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PART II
PACIFIC COLONIES IN TRANSITION
GERMAN TRADE SETTLES IN SAMJA
August Unshelm, the m:mager for Godeffroys, visited Sarroa in search
of a Pacific headquarters central to the coconut oil trade, which the
firm intended to exploit. Unshelm settled at Apia in 1857 because of the
missionary and whaling stations already in place. It provided the center
for transhipment of coconut oil to Europe gathered from his agents
throughout the Pacific.
The House of Godeffroy prospered under his successor, Theodor Weber,
who the British referred to as the "South Sea King" and who utilized
skillful methods akin to rrachiavellianism to achieve his aims. "By the
exercise of great tact and a sha.v of liberality in dealing with the
natives" a former employee asserted that Weber "in a great measure
swallowed up the trade of the Samoan group" (FOX: 138). In 1867 he began
to change his operations from coconut oil to copra collection. In order
to insure a steady supply, he began to legitimately purchase land from
the Sarroans. "A rrania for selling land" swept Sarroa as "turmoil and
warfare in the late sixties stimulated a demand for firearms." "It is
averred that the existence of a Godeffroy arms factory at Liege conferred
a distinctive advantage over rivals, and it was implicitly believed by
some that Weber deliberately let loose the dogs of war to stimulate the
sale of land (FOX: 141). "During this period of turmoil Weber purchased
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25,000 acres, while a San Francisco syndicate engaged in speculation and
claimed to have purchased in excess of 300,000 acres (Kennedy: 10).
Mulifanua and Vailele, DHPG plantations, were instituted in 1865 and
1867,as a result of this era of turmoil. By 1875 Weber held control over
61,500 hectares of suitable crop land (FOX: 28) and (Hempenstall: 28).
Successful and well ensconced in Samoa, Weber formulated a scheme for
annexation and colonization in the late 1860 's which he presented to
Bismarck while on a visit to Berlin (Townsend: 66). Chinese tenant
farmers were to grow rice, jute, sugar cane and coconuts on the lowlands,
while German settlers were to render the uplands productive of coffee,
corn, tobacco and cinchona. Finding it difficult to involve Samoans in
plantation labor, he found it necessary to draw upon labor from Niue,
Raratonga, fram the Line Islands and the atolls of Micronesia (FOX: 142).
The importation of Micronesians increased until the late seventies, when
approximately 1200 were in Samoa; but thereafter, the supply dwindled
and he turned to the Bismarck Archipelago and Mioko region for contract
labor (FOX: 143).
SAMOA AT WAR AND FOREIGN INTRIGUE: 1870 TO 1883
In Samoan affairs, the death of Malietoa Mali in 1866 left his family
divided; some supported his brother Tavalou, others his son Laupepe.
Misconstruing Samoan culture in the light of European concepts of
heredity, the British consul and missionaries supported Laupepe.
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Traditional conflict between the Turrua and pule, two groups of Sarroan
talking chiefs, ensued (FOX: 138). The German plantations were often
vandalized and Weber sought to curtail the fighting by offering the
owortunity of annexation to Bismarck in 1871, primarily to protect his
financial investments. Bismarck, however, would not support his request
and the fighting continued until the missionaries and European consuls
were able to curtail the strife in 1873 (Fox: 138). A constitution
blending Western and Samoan ideals was created and Malietoa Laupepe and
Tupua Pulepule were alternately to share the royal titles, while the high
chiefs and talking chiefs occupied the two house legislature, the Ta'imua
and Faipule.
Colonel A.B. Steinberger, a former American official sent to Sarroa in
1872 by President Grant to survey the problems, was appointed as the
Prime Minister of the new government. He served in the position for less
than a year, disguising the fact that he no longer possessed the backing
of the united States government and that he had driven a secret bargain
with Godeffroy, while in Germany, for support in return for special
treatment and a monopoly for Godeffroy's business. While he had endeared
himself to the Samoan leadership by his attempt to establish a unified
Samoan body, the EurOPean consuls, inclUding Weber of the DHPG, resented
him for his meddling. In 1874 the United States government absolved
itself of any support for his leadership and the consuls were then
successfull in having him deported in 1875 (Kennedy: 9).
out of embarrassment, the Steinberger affair led to Malietoa
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Laupepe's rerroval and the Sarroan Ta 'urnua and Faipule decided not to
appoint a successor. For three years Samoans rested in a period of
relative tranquilty and freedom from strife, but in 1876 Malietoa Laupepe
returned Upolu to political chaos. He set up his seat of government at
A' ana and found encouragement in German and English adventurers. He
attempted to overthrow the Ta' imua and Faipule, but his warriors were
dispersed in battle (Kennedy: 12).
Griffin, the new Amercian consul, urged the Sarroan leadership to
maintain the old Steinberger system. Alarmed at this American
intervention, Weber again pressed for recognition of German rights and
threatened damage claims and intervention with use of a German
warship. When the German warship arrived, the Sarroan leadership
requested the united States for protectorate status and Griffin
accepted. The U.S. Congress, however, was suspicious of the situation
and determined that the goverrunent need not be involved with anything
that smacked of colonialism. Congress at the time did not want to give a
hint of cooperating with Britain against the Germans (Kennedy: 13). The
affair ended with an American-Sarroan Treaty of Friendship in 1878, which
granted the United states most favored nation privileges, rights to a
naval station at pago harbor, and a statement that the United States
would aid Samoa " if differences occurred with other governments"
(Kennedy: 14).
Griffin's proclamation of a protectorate forced Weber's hand again.
In July of 1878, he requested the German Navy to seize several harbors of
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Upolu in order to "force a helpless Samoa government payoff old
compensation claims" (Kennedy: 15). At the time he succeeded in having
two harbors blockaded. Early in 1879 the warships returned to Samoa, and
the rratter was settled in a "friendly" fashion. A German-Samoan Treaty
of Friendship was signed in 1879. It granted Germany most favored nation
status, freedom from import and export duties, and a naval station at
Saluafata. In addition, all Samoan laws relating to German subjects were
to be submitted to German authorities and could only come into force with
German approval (Kennedy: 16).
Bismarck was reasonalbly satisfied that the treaty \\QuId aid the
situation in Samoa and protect German interests in the islands, based
upon a clause of the treaty granting Germans the peaceable possession of
all lands of Samoa. Unlike his consul, Bismarck had no stomach for
annexation of samoa. Strong Reichstag opposition and the desire to avoid
any confrontation with either England or the United States determined his
response (Kennedy: 17).
By 1879, the power of the Ta' imua and the Faipule had declined and
that of Malietioa had risen. The islands were again on the verge of
civil war, with Weber "tacitly" supporting Malietoa and England behind
Tavalou. The British sent Sir Arthur Gordon from the Fiji's Western
Corrunission Office to survey the situation. Realizing that no country
could annex Samoa on the basis of their treaty arrangements, he supported
an attempt to rrake Apia an independent municipality under tripartite
administration (Kennedy: 22). When civil war broke out in 1879 between
Malietoan and Tavalouan forces, Weber employed the warship Bismarck to
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arrange a cease fire, in reality to maintain the Malietoan party in
power. Later both Tavalou and Laupepe agreed to the reestablishment of a
roc>re representative government or Ta' imua and Faipule. Tavalou was to be
considered the King and Laupepe was appointed as his regent. A three man
executive council to administer Upolu was established in March of 1880
(Kennedy: 24).
The unexpected death of Tavalou in November of 1881 plunged the
islands into political chaos, again. An agreement made on board the
u.s. Lackawanna made Laupepe the King and Tapua Tarnasese the regent with
the positions to be rotated every few years. In the interim the EuroPean
consuls continued to influence saroc>an affairs. Weber had become
dissolutioned with Malietoa, because of Malietoa' s disinterest in corning
to terms with the problems of vandalism at the plantations and because of
Malietoa's education by the London Missionary Society (Kennedy: 30).
The conditions continued to worsen as Malietoa was unable or
unwilling to restrain his people and maintain law and order. The new
German consul, Captain zembsch, became so disturbed with the
disobedience, the requirement of constant naval surveillance, and the
trading in arms that he went so far as to recorrnnend the annexation of
Samoa by the British. His dislike for the intrigues on the part of both
the Saroans and EurOPeans VtDn him respect from the Saroc>ans and other
consuls, but brought his dismissal and replacement by Dr. Stuebel, a man
who would not wince at the use of naval power and who was prepared to
preserve Deutschtum in Samoa (Kennedy: 30,31).
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In 1883, agitation from New Zealand for annexation of Samoa causEd
Weber to act rrore aggressively. Weber could not accept the New Zealand
annexation, because it would assuredly involve an investigation of his
labor trade and treatment of the natives, and a review of his land
speculation. The Sydney Convention, which pointedly advocated removal of
land in the hands of foreigners, was clearly unsatisfactory for his
business. In addition, Malietoa wanted a review of land practices
because weber had acquired Mulinu' u, the traditional seat of sarroan
government fran an American settler (Kennedy: 34 ,35) • Malietoa offered
U8$5000 for the return of MUlinu'u Point, but the Germans responded that
it would be held in reparation for Samoan misdeeds and for violation of
German property (Le Suer: 139). For their part, the Germans had suffered
enough fran the native civil war and deprivations to their plantations.
AN ERA OF GERMAN COUPS: 1884 TO 1899
In 1884 Stuebel and Weber forced a treaty upon Malietoa giving
Germany unquestionable authority in the conduct of native affairs
(Hempenstall: 28)and (Appendix). When the warship Bismarck was in port,
Stuebel and Weber summoned Malietoa to sign a German-Samoan Treaty. The
docurrent provided for a German-Sarroan State Council, a German Secretary
or Advisor to the King, a German Treasurer, that Germans control
appointment to and control of the police, and a clause that redressed
German claims by punishment. Weber's action was not spontaneous; as
early as 1883, Weber had drawn up the document, but no warship had
arrived to enforce it (Kennedy: 35).
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"Unable to subject Malietoa to his will and enraged about renewed
secret appeals for British protection, Weber threw all the weight of
German influence in Samoa in favor of the Vice-King Tamasese, and when
the King protested, Stuebel had rrarines land in January 1885 and took
over Mulinu I u Point, raising the German flag" (Kennedy: 44). Shortly
thereafter, the German contingent occupied Apia and Tarnasese was
proclaimed King. Upon word of his consul's action in Samoa, Bismarck
reprirranded von Kusserow for attempting to support Stuebel. He
instructed the Navy that there would be no support for Stuebel' s action
and informed Gladstone that he intended to rraintain the status quo. He
preferred to achieve Samoa be legal means and had no intention to
disregard the treaty rights of the other powers (Kennedy: 45) It was at
this time that Bismarck's son Herbert was in long bargaining sessions
with the English over the partition of the pacific.
After 1885, Br itain became less of an obstacle for Germany, but the
United States influence increased. The English consul assured Malietoa
that the situation could be worked out, but England could take no
territory as Salisbury had no intention to anger Bismarck. Malietoa then
offered to place Samoa under United States protection. The American
consul, Greenbaum, accepted but the Secretary of state, Bayard,
repudiated the agreement (Le Suer: 141). Meanwhile Weber continued to
make plans for a German administration and he wrote to the Forieign
Office for a stipend of 100 ,000 Marks which the DHPG would use to
administer the government.
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During a visit by a special three-power cormnission, the Germans
approached the English and Americans and pressed, although lightly, for
rrore German control of sarroa. Germany tMJuld allow Tonga to be
administered by Britain and pago Pago to be neutralized. The proposal
was acceptable to the British and they agreed to present it to the
Americans at the washington Conference in the Surraner of 1887 (Kennedy:
58-59). As a result of the close relationship that had developed between
Bismarck and Salisbury, they drafted a secret agreement on April 23,
1887, which had to do as nuch with European affairs as with Sam:>a. The
British gave Germany nde facto n control of Samoa in exchange for free
trade and navigation in the islands. Because Germany believed that
Tamasese had universal support and would win in a Samoan election, the
Germans proposed that the nkingshipn be elective.
At the Washington Conference of June, 1887, Bayard would accept no
arrangement giving Germany nde facto n control of Sarroa. He was
particularly annoyed to hear from one of his informers that Brandeis, a
former DHPG employee, was training Tamasese's military forces.
Consequently, the Conference did not go past six sessions.
Bayard's strong position forced the German government to take a rrore
drastic stand in Samoa. Becker, the new consul, called for four warships
on the 23rd of August. He demanded $13,000 in reparations, landed 700
marines, declared martial law, and put the Samoans under curfew. Malietoa
was deposed, Tamesese was installed as King, and the municipal government
of Apia was declared in abeyance (Knight: 69).
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The German coup generated another set of problems for Becker and the
DHPG. The British and American consuls took a hard line on this latest
German adventure. The Washington government stiffened its intercourse
with Bismarck, but Salisbury, having given Bismarck a free hand in samoa,
reprimanded his consul (Kennedy: 69). "Tamesese Tupua was very soon
discredited in the eyes of Samoans and non-Europeans by the methods used
to eliminate political oppostion and to impose demands of a centralized
government 00 the decentralized Islanders" (Hempenstall: 28). Anarchy
and intertribal battle ensued and the chiefs only supported him when the
German warships were in port (Kennedy: 69).
In December of 1887, Commodore Heusner of the German Imperial Navy
warned the German Admiralty, that Tamasese I s government could only exist
with the implementation of force (Kennedy: 73). Brandeis was using every
means possible to maintain Tamasese in power, including the importation
of extensive shipments of arms, but his autocratic and unpopular measures
were unable to prevent unrest. He even went so far as to ban public
assemblies and cricket matches by the English residents.
In consequence of Tarrasese I s unsatisfactory handling of government
and people, Malieatoa engineered an insurrection headed by ~1ata 'afa
Josefo in September of 1888. The immediate reasons were an announcement
of a capitation tax, deportations of Samoans for misdeeds against German
persons or property, and Tamasese I s claim to the title of Tafa I ifa •
Brandeis led a force of 500 to root out Mata'afa, but found instead that
his forces were routed from their implacements and compelled to take a
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position at Mulinu 'u Point, under the protection of the warship Adler.
Having receivErl nnnors of Mata' afa' s intention to pillage Apia, the
Americans and British landed troops to protect their citizens. Malietoa,
was taken under house arrest, placed on a warship and secretly taken
first to Hamburg and then to the Marshall Islands (Kennedy: 75-78).
Dr. Knawe, the newly installed German consul, received a request
from Weber in late 1888 to prevent the plunderings of his plantations by
Samoan warriors. Knappe requested a contingent of marines to confine
Mata' afa and bring him to justice. Before the marines could reach their
intendErl destination, Mata'afa's forces ambushed 50 of the Germans. This
prompted Knappe to proclaim a state-of-war and request military support
fran Germany. Bismarck, infuriated by Knappe's proclamation and
suggested annexation, fiercely scolded Knappe publicly for breaking
established treaties. Bismarck also declined to support Tamasese, on the
advice of naval officers, and for reasons of cost in men, supplies and
hardware (Kennedy: 77,78).
Bismarck's retreat was the result of many factors. There was
universal condemnation in the United States for the actions of the
Germans in Sarroa, the Congress in Washington appropriated $600, 000 for
protection of U.S. rights in Pago pago, and mobilization of the U.S.
fleet had been rurrored. At the time, Bismarck genuinely feared an
American reprisal and was unwilling to take an anti-American attitude.
In other respects, relations in Europe were insecure, that is, the French
and Russians had arrived at detente; Bismarck's standing in the
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Reichstag was waning with the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and his
relationship with Salisbury required that he take no aggressive actions.
In the end, Bismarck proposed the Berlin Conference. He was "anxious to
come to an understanding in the subject by peaceful negotiations"
(Kennedy: 81).
The hurricane of March 15th, in which all the American, English and
German warships in Apia Harbor were destroyed except the British
"Calliope", convinced the three powers that the cost in men and machinery
probably was not worth what Samoa had to offer.
At the Berlin Conference Sarroa was declared an independent neutral
country. The municipal goverrunent of Apia was reorganized and linked
with the indigenous Sarroan goverrunent through a Supreme court, and
Malietoa Laupepe was reinstated with the consent of Tamasese's
followers. But he immediately gave up his position to Mata' afa, who was
unsatisfactory as leader of the Samoa Islands for the Germans. In
consequence, the German consuls and Bismarck appealed to the British, who
then threw their support to Malieatoa.
The period after the reorganization was marked by an unsettling truce
and wrangling among the divided consuls and Samoans. The government of
Europeans was constructed in a piecemeal fashion; some of the officials
arrived in Samoa as much as one and one half years late and the municipal
administration was in disarray. The Sarroan goverrunent had neither rroney
nor enough influence among the people to maintain order (Kennedy: 98-99).
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Matters went fran bad to worse in 1891. The Europeans were always
quarreling. Schmidt, the Chief Justice, annoyed everybody, the American
and English consuls were at each other's throat and a deadlock existed on
many issues. Mata'afa moved his headquarters away from Apia to Malie and
was made king by his supporters. By the beginning of 1892, Samoa lacked
"peace, order or effective administration." Faced with administrative
chaos fran the constant bickering between officials, the Americans
proposed a conference to iron out the problems. At this stage, the
Germans refused, but replaced their chief justice and president with more
congenial and less rigid rren. The Land Commission, which ruled upon
claims and arbitrated disputes, was about the only operation that could
claim to be effective. No land squabbles or incidents occured after 1894
(Kennedy: 100-102).
Civil war broke out in 1893; Mata'afa was again in rebellion. This
time his main support came from his traditional opponents, or Tamasese's
group after his death. Caught between a rock and a hard spot, the
Germans and English managed to convince Mata' afa to tum himself in for
the sake of Samoa. After his surrender, he was deported to the Marshall
Islands on a German warship. But the unrest was not quelled with
Mata 'afa 's departure, the DHPG plantations continued to be vandalized
and Tamasese' s son took up the resistance by leading forces against the
government. Having had their fingers burnt from intervention previously,
the Germans and British remained cool to the idea of sending troops this
tirre. Weber was clearly concerned. He appealed to the administration to
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curtail the sale of arms and support a policy of disarmament. This was a
significant change fran his position when he supported Brandeis in the
late 1880's (Kennedy: 101).
In 1894, New Zealand proposed a protectorate over the Samoas to the
alarm of the Germans. Prime Minister Richard Seddon, known to be a
strong but popular imperialist, petitioned London for New Zealand
administration of Samoa. It came at a time when all three powers were
becoming increasingly dissi11usioned over Samoa. For Germany, the
growing influence of the London Missionary Society and English teachers
and the competition from Australian business served to diminish its
prospective of DeutschtLnn in Samoa. For Weber, it capped a period of
financial loss. From 1889 through 1894, the DHPG plantations had
sustained enough damage to incur successive losses for the company. By
1894, Weber was willing to sell the DHPG operations in Samoa and had been
negotiating with a New Zealand firm for its purchase. However, the sale
never went through, since his asking price was too high.
perhaps Seddon realized that the time was ripe for annexation by a
single pJwer. All three pJwers realized that some change rust occur.
"There was little hope of this unique structure of government functioning
smoothly when the vast majority of the participants and observers looked
forward to its future demise" (Kennedy: 114). Therefore, what was to
happen next was against the best aims of the three powers.
Both the London and German press caught hold of the issue and
proceeded to make it a matter of national pride. A colonial campaign
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cornrrenced with Seddon on one side and the Pan-Gerrnan League on the
other. Neither Britain or Germany could yield for the sake of loss of
face (Kennedy: 116) The Navy League went so far as to advocate the
taking of Samoa with a group of six cruisers and landing forces.
Caprivi, not anyone to force an issue against the security of his
country, refused to go along with the plans of the League and Kayser,
Director of the Colonial Department. However, the attitude of the
government changed with the demise of caprivi and the accession of
Wilhelm II as Kaiser, with von Bulow as Chancelor. Eoth men were
"Kolonialmensch" and it seemed an "exciting" overseas policy to the
Kaiser. Yet the planned German coup did not take place; the United
States did not awear to be backing down from its position on Samoa; the
British were not frightened by Admiral Tirpitz's great naval aspirations;
and in the end, the situation in Africa proved to overshaddow the
relatively minor incidents in Samoa (Kennedy: 118-120).
By the end of the nineteenth century Samoa was preparing for another
round of strife and warfare. Upon Malietoa's death, the Samoans united
with the Tumua and Pule in favor of Mata'afa, who had recently returned
from exile. The American Chief Justice, Chambers, put the government in
the hands of the legal heir, Tanumafili Malietoa. Civil war was on
again, except this time, Mata'afa's rebels, with German support, set fire
to a greater part of Apia. Dr. Raffel, the German consul, took control
of the government, but was recalled by the Colonial Department. The
Americans then arrived in February of 1899, proclaimed Mata'afa's
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government to be illegal under the terms of the Berlin Conference of
1889, opened fire on his rebels with warships and British marines were
landed. en March 23, 1899, Tanurnafili was restored to power, Mata' afa
was in rebellion and the islands in anarchy (Fox: 140) and (LeSuer:
145-147) •
An international corranission was established in August of 1899 by the
three powers; the tripartite decision abolished the "kingship" principle
and placed the government temporarily in the hands of an administrator
with a council of consuls assisted by a native assembly and a high-court
justice. Great Britain waived her claims to Sanna for privileges in the
other islands of the pacific. The United States received Tutuila, Manua
and the other eastwardly islands of the Sannas. Germany then annexed
Upolu and Savaii; they were to be under the control of its treaty
negotiator, Wilhelm Solf, and Sanna was braced for the period of Imperial
rule (LeSuer: 148) and (Hempenstall: 31).
THE NEW GUINEA COMPANY SETS UP SHOP: 1884 TO 1889
captain Otto Finsch' s "scientific expedition" arrived at Astrolabe
Bay on the northern coast of New Guinea in 1884 to a rousing reception of
"OH MACLAY." Nikolai Mikloucho-Maclay, a Russian naturalist, who settled
in the area in 1871 carre to be revered as a demigod by the natives as a
result of the material goods that he could acquire. He lived in good
stead with them until his departure in 1883, when he predicted his
European "brothers" would follow. The German arrival appeared as
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confirmation of the prediction. Finsch raised the flag at Finschhafen,
the first settlement for the company, in November 1884. It was to be the
scene of the great experiment in planned colonization from Australia and
Germany (Hempenstall: 164).
Paron George von Schleinitz was the first appointed Governor of the
New Guinea Company. The initial tasks issued to him by the Berlin
Directors of the Company were to: open up land which was unowned, for
company use; determine the topography of the area; and learn the language
and customs of the natives. In the first years of Company colonization,
von Schleinitz encountered some serious problems. He wrote that manage-
ment suffered, not from native resistance or conflict, nor from soil
availability or fertility, but from "the lack of willing and skilled
labor, which first has to be trained and brought in from elsewhere; and
from the discharge of the functions associated with the political adminis-
tration assigned to the Company, which are rendered considerably more
difficult by the legal position created at the outset by the legislation
of the German Reich" (New Guinea Company Annual Report: 1886-87). Peter
Hempenstall writes that the Company was "overrun by an army of officials
trying to administer numerous impracticle regulations derived from
Prussian civil and criminal law" (Hempenstall; 165). For example, land
prices were determined by the Berlin Directors and their approval of the
sale could take as much as six months.
The relations with the natives soon became a problem. From the time
of initial settlement in the area, the New Guinea Company had never
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formulated a native policy, but its position was that the natives were to
be considered a "natural resource to be exploited with a minimum of
outlay" (Hempenstall: 165). Shortly after the colony's foundation, von
Schleinitz could no longer rely upon a local supply of native labor and
he was forced to import workers from the Bismarck Archipelago. Relations
with the mainland natives became progessively less cordial as land
disputes caused a number of misunderstandings. Attacks on Schrniel, his
deputy, and other personnel forced von Schleinitz to deal with the local
natives in a more brutal fashion. In response, a police force was
instituted to curb violence (New Guinea Company Annual Report: 1886-87).
As a result of his administrative difficulties, von Schleinitz also
altered the Imperial government laws to fit the colony's requirements,
but legislation remained a privilege of the Imperial Chancellor, with two
jUdges, one in Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the other in the Bismarck
Archipelago to administer it. However, he forbade trading in weapons,
amnunition and liquor, and empowered the station managers to discipline
the natives (Moses, I.: 290). A portion of the draft ordinances
contained measures for criminal conduct which even Berlin officials found
disturbing. He had sanctioned food rations, confinement and flogging and
"explained away its heavy emphasis on corporal punishment with the
observation, that from childhood, pacific Islanders, Malays and Chinese
were accustomed to blows and other severe punishment" (New Guinea Company
Annual Report: 1887-88). These altered regulations were ultimately
tempered by the Berlin officials. The overall, effect, however, was to
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transfer jurisdiction over the natives to the New Guinea Company until
1897. This was accomplished by the Kaiser's Imperial Ordinance of July,
1888, which initially guaranteed just, humane treatment for the natives.
Von Schleinitz resigned shortly thereafter, because of differences of
policy. Attitudes did not change rapidly, however, as one could find
mistreatment by white settlers well into the Australian period
(Hempenstall: 166).
By the end of 1890, no verdict in a criminal case had ever been
passed against a native in court. Swift retaliatory actions were
employed to handle the natives. Several courses of actions were employed
by the New Guinea Company: villages would often be forced to supply
hostages when the culprit was not apprehended or arrested; compensation,
e. g ., pigs, livestock and vegetables were requested of the family or
village; villages were occassionally forcibly subdued; and the torching
of settlements had not been unknown (Moses, I.: 291).
In addition, the actions of Stanislaw Kubary from 1887 to 1889
contributed to poor relations with the local natives. Kubary zealously
proclaimed land purchases from his ship along Astrolabe Bay by posting
notices of purchase and generally did not enter into agreements of sale
with the natives. The disputes arrising out of his claims became a
constant source of friction between the Company and the Siar, the tribe
which C1NI1ed the land. When the Company attempted to dislodge them and
deny them use of the traditional fishing grounds, they sought mediation
from the neWly arrived missionaries, who upheld the Company's claim. For
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the next several years, the Siar people passively resisted by refusing to
work the plantations being cleared on their land (Hempenstall: 168).
THE DECLINE OF 'IRE NEW GUINEA COMPANY: 1889 TO 1899
Fran 1889 to 1891 the Imperial Commissioner! Fritz Rose, "virtually
ran the oolony during the interlude of imperial administration" of the
new colony (Hernpenstall: 171). After surveying the New Guinea company
records, Rose felt accutely the need to start again from scratch, to
establish shipping communications, to create harbors and landing places,
to cut roads and to improve relations with the natives. He was well
aware of the existing problems, particularly with the relationship
between whites and natives. Skirmishes with native forces occured
throughout the Company's brief history. Therefore, he sought to
establish intermediaries in each settlement to lessen the danger of
violence. At the same time, he realized the need for a larger and more
effective police force to keep the peace, and the inadequacy of the
German Navy to carry out the task. In fact, the Foreign Office in 1887
and the Gerrran Admiralty set limits on the use of military forces by
personal fiat and without written request for action (Hempenstall: 169).
April 1892 saw the return of administration of the protectorate to
the Canpany, with plans for retrenchment. The unprofitable stations of
Finschhaffen, Hatzfeldthafen, and Jornbe near Madang were closed down.
The case of Finschhafen was exascerbated by an outbreak of fever which
killed more than a dozen of the Company's officials. The Company started
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anew, with exploration and an intention to open up new opportunities.
Again it was forced to look outside its chief port of Madang for labor,
because no rran could be forcibly induced to v.urk the plantations; the
Company lacked the means to establish or enforce a labor system (Moses,I:
298). The Siar people were in arms and other groups were restive. When
mid-decade rolled around; it was evident that the adminis-tration of the
protectorate should not rerrain in the hands of the New Guinea Company.
The Company's Directors in Berlin decided that it was not possible to
carry out colonization under Bisrrarck' s original concept of Charter, so
it began to negotiate for the complete transfer of govern-mental affairs
to the Colonial Office. The New Guinea Company formally relinquished
administration of the colony to the German government in 1899. The New
Guinea Company was the last Charter company to relinquish government
control of the original companies licensed by Bismarck to administer
colonial territories (Hempenstall: 173).
Personal relationships and the attitudes that the Company officials
held contributed significantly to their problems. "Whereas responsible
officials tried to gain the natives' trust, cooperation, and even
friendship by learning the vernacular, getting acquainted with local
custans and respecting these in their dealings with the native
population, others found it impossible to cOIIUTlUnicate with them at all.
Contempt for, as well as fear of the numerically superior masses,
indifference to their culture, or hatred of them, as well as personality
problems, which were accentuated by the isolation of a station, by the
pressure and stress of their position, and by the trying climate, led
these men in a ruthless sometimes savage way" (Moses,I.: 293).
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At the close of its Charter, the New Guinea Company had little to
show in terms of success. It had provided no roads, no health station,
no maps for the protectorate, and no substantial settlement. Its
colonial expatriates nanaged to alienate coastal PeOples, and had it not
been for the mediations of the missionaries, the Company may have found
itself in the middle of a bloodbath. The reasons for its failure had
been: too much central control in the initial development stages;
corruption in Berlin; an anarchial administration at Finschhafen;
constant turnover of personnel; natural disasters; the accumulation of a
massive debt; lack of programs to bring the natives into cooperation;
both passive and active resistance by the natives; and the refusal to
establish security in the area (Townsend: 149-150) and (Hempenstall: 173).
AIthough the company remained as an economic force on mainland New
Guinea until World War II, it had lost the status it enjoyed under the
Charter. It no longer had the right: to promulgate laws defining the
legal position of the protectorate and the laws applicable to the
territory administration of the protectorate; to conduct all foreign
affairs of the protectorate; nor the right to organize and comnand all
military forces in the protectorate (Townsend: 148).
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO: SETTLEMENT TO 1899
A decade before the establishment of the protectorate in New Guinea,
Eduard Hernsheim set up his first trading station at Port Hunter of the
Duke of York group in 1875. He had arrived shortly after the missionary,
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George Brown, of the Australasian Wesleyan Methodist Missionary society.
Trading had previously been restricted to barter commerce in the islands
and traders had to gather and dry their own coconuts. Because this was
often perilous without the support of the natives, traders carried
firearms and violence was a common aspect of the trade. Ten of
C<de££roys' traders ca~ to a violent a~d in ~he late 1870's: After the
failure of Godeffroys, the DHPG carried on exploratory commerce in the
1880 's along the Gazelle coast of New Britain (Henpenstall: 120-121).
During the late 1870's, a desire emerged among the Tolai, a native people
of the Gazelle peninsula, for firearms. The supply of weapons to the
Tolai was met by means of trade for parcels of land and it was mutually
satisficatory to both parties. The traditional war leaders or luluais
found it advantagous to carry firearms which were more effective than the
spears of their enemies.
The period 1882 to 1885 marked a particularly active time for such
land purchases. At this time Queen Emma, a part-Samoan woman of high
status and married to a European, was able to amass a vast area of land
at Ralum Point on the Gazelle peninsula and elsewhere. According to
Hempenstall, "it was Ralum which led the way in developing commercial
plantations on a large scale" in the Bismarck Archipelago
(Hempenstall:125). Queen Emma was successful because she recognized that
one could conduct business effectively by functioning as a "big man" in
the society. Her provision of generous feasting won over the populace.
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Law and order on the Gazelle peninsula had been established by means
of a private police force prior to German annexation in 1884. This
changed after 1884, as planter and native existed by mutual accomodation
under terms of economic advantage for both. Technically, the New Guinea
Company put little emphasis upon development in the Bismarck
Archipelago. The only signs of Company activity was a magistrate located
at Matupit (Hempenstall: 126).
Friendly relations broke clown between settlers and the Tolai in the
early 1880's when Queen Emma began constructing roads through Tolai
territory. It gave rise to the Tolai "bullet-proof ointment" war of
1893. Schmiel, then the New Guinea Company Governor, arrived to
arbitrate the dispute, since it had disruptive affects on the company's
labor force at Herberthohe. Ultimately the Tolai suffered
significantly. Schmiel was unable to mediate the dispute and then
unleashed German marines, European settlers and New Ireland laborers upon
the Tolai villages. Thereafter, the Tolais remained peaceful and the
Germans inaugurated a new phase of development in the area. Schmiel,
concerned about the degree of hostility present, intended to set up land
reserves to protect the Tolais in the future. He died on a trip to
Berlin in 1895 and was replaced by Imperial JUdge Albert Hahl in 1896.
Hahl's administration coincided with the denouement of the New Guinea
Company, but he proved himself an active participant in governmental and
island affairs. Basically, Albert Hahl was interested in strengthening
both the status of the planter and the New Guinea native. He felt it
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could be accomplished by bringing them into the administrative system,
educating them and elevating them economically. "Albert Hahl early
established a tradition of direct, personal and dynamic administration by
constant travelling, by initiating contacts with outlying communities, by
leading expeditions and police tours and by helping to resolve parochial
disputes" (Hempenstall: 132). His first problem was the resolution of
the Tolai issue. He knew the Tolai had not grasped the full implications
of land purchases, namely, that their people would be permanently
alientated from their land. He also agreed to negotiate with Queen EIrnna
to establish a reserve for the Tolai and to convince her that her scheme
for resettlement of their tribe must be shelved.
Secondly, he expected a sound Colonial Empire. Therefore, he wanted
to provide a secure territory for efficient plantation commerce. This
included the construction of road networks fran trade routes into the
hinterland and at strategic points. Rather than impress the natives for
labor - he was not interested in another uprising - he used prisoners to
do most of the work. To adjudicate disputes, carry administrative
decisions to the villages, and primarily oversee road construction in the
localities, he created the position of "luluai" with limited administra-
tive authority. The system was not perfect, but it brought the natives
closer to the colonial government (Hempenstall: 135). By 1899 Hahl had
made some progress, but apart from the east coast of the Gazelle
peninsUla, "it fell to individuals to insure their own safety, a task




BERLIN'S COLONIAL POLICY, 1885 'ID 1914
BISMARCK RETURNS TO POLICY OF CAUTION: 1885 'ID 1890
The Reichstag had cane to be a thorn in Bismarck's side during the
late 1880's, particularly with respect to his colonization policies. In
the early 1880's the National Liberals split on tariff issues, united
with the Progressives and formed the Freisinnige party which in turn
united with the Socialist Party in opposition to Bismarck's policy. In
the spirit of liberalism, these representatives could not support coloni-
zation's capitalistic approach, nor indecent treatment of natives. They
considered it foolish: the policy could not be supported by the
government purse (Townsend: 95). After annexation of both African and
Pacific areas in 1884, this political cartel continued to admonish
Bismarck and disturb his activities at home.
with the extension of German protection over the Marshall Islands and
the Caroline Islands in 1885, Germany's expansion of Empire conflicted
with the interests of Spain. In 1884, European traders and the chiefs of
Yap petitioned the Spanish crown for annexation of the Caroline Islands.
Less than a year later and within several days of the other, the spanish
accepted the request while the German gunboat Ilitch proclaimed German
protection over the islands. The actions of the two countries aroused a
public outcry in both, to the extent that the German embassy in Madrid
was sacked. Uninterested in disturbing the security of the Spanish
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throne, Bismarck submitted the dispute to Pope Leo XIII (Brown: 140) and
(Hezel: 353).
Bismarck's strategy was masterfully executed. Not only did Germany
receive trading rights in the islands and a papal Decoration for
Bismarck i but it nearly vanquished his opposition in the Reichstag.
Prior to this action, the Center Party, which was Catholic-dominated, had
held the balance of power in the Reichstag and normally sided with the
Freisinnige and socialists. Bismarck's further opposition to the Arab
Slave Trade in Africa, a position sponsored by the Center party, and the
deferral of the Micronesian question to Rome, won the Center party over
to him. He now was free to seek support of his colonial policies and
rroney to administer then and he again reiterated in the Reichstag that
German administration of colonies Y.Ould be in the hands of the Charter
companies (Townsend: 117-119).
Bismarck, however, kept the colonial administration within the
jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, partly to control expenses and
primarily to avoid the Reichstag. He was in no rrood to open his
administration to the criticisms of the parties and unwilling to engage
in nhorsetrading. n If he wanted to spend rrore rroney, it meant a full
budget review. He did not believe it was worth the effort at that time
to engage the Reichstag over colonial matters (Smith: 43).
Bismarck's reconciliation with England began after the crises of
1884. He accomplished a definitive settlement of New Guinea boundaries
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in 1885 and a "fait accompli" over East Africa. His manipulation of the
equilibrium between French, Austrians and Russians and the removal of
Anglo-Russian friction in Afghanistan enabled him to abandon his
"camouflage" and assure the British of support in Egypt against France,
so long as Great Britain recognized German colonial claims in Africa and
the Pacific (Townsend: 112). Fram 1886 to 1890, Bismarck "subordinated
his colonial policy more and more to his foreign policy, dictated in turn
by Germany's European position, which was none too secure. He strove for
the English entente, the maintenance of the Russian Reinsurance Treaty,
and the holding apart of the two flank powers, eshewed all aggressive
action in the colonial field and returned almost to the caution of the
early seventies" (Townsend: 114).
Prominent colonialists, like Felix Fabri, did not like Bismarck's
policies after annnexation. Fabri attached Bismarck vehemently. He
responded that Bismarck was negligent not to establish regular
administrations, that he failed to invest in economic development and
that he didn't acquire suitable territiories for colonial settlement.
Fabri turned away fran Bismarck until the latter fell from power in
1890. But Bismarck refused to bend to the colonialists, for he was far
more concerned with secure international relations and entente with
England (smith: 44).
From the period 1885 to 1889, Bismarck also chose to determine
foreign policy without his advisor, von Kusserow, who had served him
through the early 1880' s. He had alledgely dismissed von Kusserow for
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"lackluster performance" (Smith: 46). "In the interim, colonial affairs
were channeled through various departments on a case-by-case basis. This
low-level pattern obviously conformed to Bismarck's notions of colonial
administration" (Smith: 45). Perhaps Bismarck was indeed disgusted with
the handling of the prior affairs by his Foreign Affairs Council.
REI'RENCHMENT UNDER CAPRIVI: 1890 'ID 1895
German colonial decisions under General Leo von Caprivi, Bismarck's
successor, subordinated the colonies to an even greater degree than had
Bismarck. Caprivi was indifferent to colonial expansion, had no fixed
colonial policy, and expressed a willingness to give up colonial
territories for the security of the homeland. Although he recognized
advantages fram economic development and perceived them as another means
of overseas defences, he preferred company control rather than govern-
mental entanglements (Townsend: 159-161).
Caprivi's attitude about colonial Empire is responsible for two
significant changes fram Bismarck's mode of rule. Caprivi reorganized
the structure of the colonial administration under pressure from the
Reichstag, which wanted a colonial administration accountable to itself.
He, unlike Bismarck, was willing to share his interests with the
Reichstag and he created the Kolonialabteilung or Colonial Department
which became a special section of the Foreign Office. Dr. Paul Kayser
was appointed its Director and became the individual who defended policy
and requested budget appropriations before the Reichstag (Smith: 45,46).
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In order to maintain a tighter grip on the territorial administrations,
Caprivi placed all governors under the direct supervision of Kayser.
In 1891, Caprivi established the Kolonialrat. The Kolonialrat was a
special advisory body of colonial participants appointed on the basis of
their interest and expertise in colonial affairs to sit with Kayser, the
Director, for the pUrPOse of improving the government's colonial
policies. The Kolonialrat consisted of nineteen colonial participants,
two representatives from missionary societies and several members of the
public. Forerrost arrong the members were von Hansemann, the developer of
the New Guinea Company, and Weber, Director of the Deutsche Handels and
plantagen Gesellschaft.
The period from 1890 to 1895 represented a time of opposition to the
government in the Reichstag and growing weariness with colonization arrong
the pUblic. The Reichstag became the arena for debate of colonial
policies. Although Caprivi's administration and Kayser's policies, in
particular, were attacked from many sides, there appeared no clear center
power, nor was there a single group that could establish a consensus. On
the whole, no Reichstag party was truly anti-colonial, but few were
pro-colonial. The domestic feature of colonialism was the most
interesting characteristic of politics during this period. "Much of
German colonial politics, therefore revolved, not around narrow business
interests in particular colonies, but around varying uses to which
colonialism could be put by broad social and economic interests within
Germany" (smith: 122).
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The National Liberals, a party of capitalists, were consistent
supporters of colonization, although they had become increasingly
disappointed with the poor financial returns and the financial losses of
not only the New Guinea Company but of the African companies as well.
The members of the National Liberal party did not possess uniform
attitudes about colonialism; but possessed a few notions in common. They
supported expenditures to develop capital resources in the colonies and
"settlement colonialism." The National Liberals were, among others, the
spokesmen for small business interests against big finance and big
industry (smith: 148).
'Ihe Center Party which eventually supported Bismarck in the late
1880's became more and more disapproving of wars and cruelties attendant
with colonialism, especially in Africa. They led the campaign to get
government to allow missionaries in the colonies. The missionaries
interests were seldom successful when pursued in and for itself, but when
their concerns paralelled others, they could prevail (Smith: 141, 143).
The Freisinnige Party occassionally took a noral stance on issues, but
for the most part its members were more concerned with economic matters.
They could accept colonies when it was evident that they were financially
successful (Smith: 146). But none of the Reichstag parties were able to
manipulate the public, carry as much political clout and stir up colonial
fever as well as the Pan-German League.
"The Pan-German League advocated an aggressive foreign policy,
government action to defend the status of the lower middle and artisan
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classes, protection of German nationality abroad and German culture at
horre, and action against ethnic minorities, especially Poles and Jews"
(Smith: 144). It had been established in 1890 to support settlement of
the colonies by German settlers and it tapped sources which appealed to
the anti-industrial segment of the middle class. The Pan-Gerrnan League
becarre Caprivi's ITOSt ardent foe, for he was big business oriented. It
attacked Caprivi for his support of Bisrnarckian attitudes, that is, his
acceptance of "concession companies" as the rreans by which colonies would
be administered. The Pan-German League also attacked caprivi for his
lack of efforts in expanding the Empire and his stance against
"settlement colonialism" (smith: 144).
Opposition to Caprivi coalesced among these parties because of his
tariff policies, and the tariff issue became the major issue of his
administration. He had introduced a reduction in the tariffs in the
early 1890's and the net effect of the reduction was a boon to industry.
The agricultural interests and anti-industrial interests attacked him
vehemently, and it accentuated the differences between the major
political parties. The general agrarian t=Osition and "settlerrent
colonialism" appealed to one side in oppostion to the conservative
alliance of big business and industry. Colonial issues that might have
been settled at the territorial level became magnified because parties to
the disputes could corrrrand t=Olitical faction support in the Reichstag"
(smith: 152).
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KAISER WILHELM II AND THE PERIOD OF STORM AND STRESS: 1895 TO 1906
Upon the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II to p:>wer in 1895, German
colonial policy was turned around overnight. The Kaiser placed himself
at the head of the colonial IIDvement, which he described as a branch of
his "lfleltpolitik." He stated that "colonial policy is only a branch of
world policy which the German Empire rrust follow for the protection of
its continental position" (Townsend: 179). His policy was marked by
"feverish attempts at acquisition of colonies and spheres of influence"
throughout the world, and he was supported by administrators who did more
than just echo his opinions. Prince Bernhard von Bulow, the new
Chancellor, Baron von Holstein, and Marshall von Bilberstein were all
strong protagonists for colonial expansion (Townsend: 181).
Wilhelm II set out on a "Neu Kurs" fram his predecessors. In the five
years preceeding 1900, he proposed a continental block against England,
supported the Boers against the English in Africa, reached out for
territories and interests in Africa, concluded a Chinese settlement in
1898, effected a "reapprochement" with England in the same year, sought
naval bases in the Philippines and acquired SalIDa, the Caroline Islands
and Mariana Islands. Some called his drive for territory the "policy of
hysterical expansionism," occasioned with "childish bluster and bad
manners" during a period of "storm and stress" (Townsend: 183-186).
The Kaiser desired a naval base in the pacific, supposedly for the
protection of German corrunercial interests. When two German missionaries
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were murdered on Shantung peninsula in China, he seized the area and
secured the Treaty of Riao-Chow in 1898. In May of 1898, Prince Henry
reportErl fran the Philippines that the people (several merchants) were
prepared to put themselves under German control. Upon the receipt of the
news, he dispatched Vice-Admiral Diederich to watch and to grab a naval
station, if suddenly liquidated by the Spanish. Seeking to avoid any
confrontation with the United States and feigning interest in the course
of treaty negotiations, he informed John Hay, the United States Secretary
of State, that Germany would not object to American annexation of the
Philippines if Germany obtained a coaling station there and acquisition
of Samoa, the Caroline and Mariana Islands (Brown: 142-145).
The Kaiser, unwilling to wait for the outcome of the SPanish-American
War, secretly negotiated the conditions of sale for Micronesia with the
SPanish who were reluctant to settle before the conclusion of the peace
treaty with the Americans. on September 10, 1898, he secured a lien
against Ponape, Yap and Kusaie and a second provisional treaty in
December of 1898 promising the sale of the Caroline and Mariana Islands
for 17.5 million Marks (Townsend: 195). Upon completion of the deal, he
iIrnnediately informed Hay, who was furious, but nevertheless acceeded to
the Kaiser's wrangling for territory.
The purchase of the islands accentuated Britain's antagonism to the
German Kaiser, but the British were in no position to complain vehemently.
The Anglo-German Treaty of 1898 allowed both countries certain rights in
Africa. The British needed friends, for Russia, France and Italy were
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threatening her colonies. 1899 was a most favorable year for Germany to
acquire territory in the pacific. The Kolonialrat sought a solution to
the crisis in Samoa. It favored a transfer of Germany's rights in Samoa
in return for a portion of the Gold Coast in Africa, the Solomons and an
indemnity payment for Samoa. Admiral von Tripitz, Director of the
Imperial Navy! however! convinced von Bulow and the Kaiser of the
strategic importance of Samoa and also succeeded in gaining a large
pUblic following for his efforts. The arrangement was reversed with the
outbreak of the Boer War, in favor of von Tripitz's recommendation, and
Germany received Upolu, Savaii and Manono from the Treaty of 1899, while
England secured Tonga, a larger part of the Solomons (Bouganville), and a
"rectification of the boundaries of Togoland and Germany's renunciation
of extra-territoriality in Zanzebar" (Townsend: 200).
The Kaiser's "Weltpolitik" initiatives were obviously a success after
the fall of Caprivi as Chancellor. Although often confused with a style
of diplonacy, its philosophy was closely related to economic or
imperialist colonialism, that which expressed colonies in terms of trade,
mining and plantations. Its key aims were expansion of German industry
and the acquisition of markets and sources of raw materials. Fornal
colonization, i.e. "settlement colonialism" played a minor role in the
formulation of Weltpolitik (smith: 175). During the 1890's, the Kaiser's
colonial policy drew its most ardent support from the Navy League and the
Kolonialgesellschaft, two organizations that often propagandized for
oneanother. They were responible for raising flagging interest among the
public for colonies and for opposing the various anti-Kaiser agrarian and
middle and low class interests (Smith: 172).
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The Kaiser's political success in foreign policy was marred by
violence abroad and strife at home. The Colonial Department's policy of
granting wholesale concessions in the colonies to attract capital proved
to be unfortunate. When the Charter corrpanies were dissolved,
concessionaires were allowed to pick up the pieces. Especially in
Africa, these firms exploited and brutalized the native inhabitants. The
Herero Rebellion saw 14,000 people starve after the government pushed
them into the desert for agitating against improper land deals and
corruption in South West Africa (Townsend: 243) • The Reichstag
representatives began to hear about the militarism associated with the
colonial bureacracy and a full-scale debate ensued.
The scandals in Africa were well published in the German press.
Again the Reichstag parties captitalized on the misfortune of the Reich's
colonial policies and the Colonial Department served as a vulnerable
symbol for the misdeeds wrought in the protectorates. The internal
"reform" movement had been gathering momentum towards the end of the
nineteenth century in Germany and its politics spilled over and became
wedded to those of the colonies. The Socialist, Freisinnige and Center
Parties became adamant against further colonial acquisitions after the
turn of the century. It was believed that the concessions had too much
foreign influence and parties opposed them for their big business
orientation. Their arguments were further backed by news of the
rebellions in the Kameroon's, East Africa and South West Africa from 1903
to 1905 (Townsend: 243). Because the questions of the concessions had
become a full-blown affair from 1901 to 1905, the Kaiser also began to
-62-
lose the aid of his rost ardent of supporters in the Reichstag, the
Conservatives and the National Liberal Parties (Smith: 161).
The Colonial Department even began to swing away from the idea that
the concession companies were the best way to maintain colonies. By 1905
the office ra'1ks determined ~~at c.l)e concessiop.8, not only had created a
condition of duress, but they had performed poorly and their operations
had impeded orderly economic growth and development (Smith: 161).
Normally colonial politics never occupied a position of national
prominence; they were always associated with other policies. But in 1906
the disputes in the Reichstag were elevated to a position of strategic
importance for both the Reichstag and the Kaiser's government. Debates
had raged over the Colonial Departments policies of resource development,
land ownership, taxation, labor supply and native participation in
administation of the colonies. The Reichstag parties discussed the
issues of who should govern, and the nature of the government, be it
directly or indirectly administered (smith: 162-164). When the Colonial
Department was pressed to request an emergency supplement to the colonial
bUdget in late 1906, the Reichstag refused (Smith: 183).
This crisis within the Reichstag offered the opportunity for the
Reichstag to press for parliamentary control over the government and its
foreign policy. The Social Derrocrats advocated abandoning the Empire,
the Center Party favored it in essence, the left liberals were split on
the issue and the Freisinnege party used the issues to avocate reforms of
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the system. Because of this crisis, von Bulow faced some very serious
difficulties. His main source of support had been the Kaiser and as a
result of the severe political strife his government had been caught in a
position of weakness (smith: 185).
In von Bulat'! "turned ~~e liability into an asset by
representing the colonial Empire as something of great national
importance and by using the Colonial Society (Kolonialgesellschaft) as
suwort" (Smith: 186). Secondly, he replaced Colonial Director Oskar
Stuebel, who had resigned over the Herero and Maji Maji rebellions in
November of 1905, with Bernhard Dernburg. Third he removed the Colonial
Department from the control of the Foreign Office and made it a ministry
as a concession to the Reichstag (smith: 186,187). Finally, he dissolved
the Reichstag and called for new parliamentary elections, claiming that
the opposition were "obstructionists and unpatriotic" (Smith: 190,191).
CHANGE AND REDIRECTION: 1907 to 1914
Dernburg was chosen by Chancellor von Bulow to lead the campaign.
Dernburg's appointment to the position of Secretary of the Colonial
Off ice was, by itself, novel. He was a dYnamic man who possessed liberal
attitudes but had close ties with big business and the conservative
elements of the econ011!i and society. He was a Jewish businessman, had
connections with the Freisinnige party, possessed progressive economic
ideologies that were reformist and favored rapid economic development.
For von BUlow, he was something of a maverick who could turn the whole
situation around for the Chancellor (smith: 187).
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Dernburg traveled the country telling the German people that the
colonies were for them, not for adventurers, traders, bureaucrats,
militarists or companies. The land was to be recovered for national use
and the natives were to be regarded as "the most valuable asset of the
colonies," to be protected with guaranteed rights (Townsend: 249). The
meetings were orga'1ized by the Kolonialgesellschaft, he derived active
aid from the Pan~erman League, and the Conservative, National Liberals
and Freisinnege Parties rallied to his patriotic platform. In the
elections, von Bulow scored a resounding victory against the opposition
(Smith: 191). He greeted the cheering crowds with "you have placed
Germany in the saddle and now she can ride" (Townsend: 243).
Although the Chancellor did well in the election against his rivals,
the experience of the previous years had been chastening. The country in
the course of the election campaign had learned of the revelations of
moral misrranagerrent and exploitation. The Colonial Secretary had been
given a double task: "on the one hand he was obliged to resuscitate and
to popularize the colonial sentirrent in Germany and, on the other,
thoroughly recontruct the political and economic administration of the
land and peoples overseas" (Townsend: 247).
The Secretary, was more successful with his reorganization of the
Colonial Office than with whipping up public sentirrent. He was credited
with establishing a competent bureacracy, sought to have colonial
officials well-educated, placed control and restraints on the military,
abolished the Kolonialrat because of its identification with private
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business and its incompatibility with the role of government, and created
an agricul tural and economics section which drew upon members of the
Chamber of Commerce for econanic and technical advice. (Smith: 197) and
(Townsend: 250).
Derpburg argued t.l-:lat t.l-:le colonies must pay for the!p.sel ves ; t..hat
government would be the crucial provider of working capital, but he did
not favor reliance upon big business for this effect. At the local
level, Dernberg reorganized the finances of the colonies, revised
colonial laws, synthesized custorrary law and tribal law, discharged
officials involved in scandals or questionable acts, regulated the
military and police practices, reconstituted the civil service, and
promoted his policy of ftSelbstverwaltung ft or self-government which
favored a multiracial, corrmunal government (Townsend: 251-253) and
(smith: 166,167).
The Dernburg era brought to the Gerrran Colonial Empire an ai r of
enlightenment and renaissance in imperialist ideology. A new flowering
of ftscientific colonialsimft which rationalized economic exploitation was
accompanied by a movement for social reform in the colonies. Dernburg
resigned in 1910, was temporarily succeeded by Lindequist for one year,
and was followed by Wilhelm Solf, former Governor of Samoa. Solf's goal
was ftto rrake peace throughout the colonial establishment and secure the
role of the Colonial Office. ft His humanitarian concern for native
protection was the most notable aspects of his administration
(Smith: 215).
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Toward the end of the German Colonial Empire, international relations
lacked the drama of the period of storm and stress. Kaiser Wilhelm's
policy began to take on a Bismarckian resemblance by 1911 and he became
ntruly freightened by the threat of isolation and encirclement. n
Therefore, he sought nto combine imperialistic ambition with a more
favorable foreign orientation by cautious, soznetimes even bold;
concessions in the colonial fieldn (Townsend: 307).
PART N
GERMANY'S PACIFIC EMPIRE, 1900 TO 1914
SAMOA UNDER WILHELM SOLF
Herr Meyer-Delius , Director of the DHPG in Apia at the turn of the
century, in a letter to the Colonial Department in January of 1900
suggested that the man to head the new position as Governor of Sanna
nallow freedom for the Samoans in their own administration and be
purposeful in his methods but experienced in handling Islandersn
(Hempenstall: 32). Wilhelm Solf was chosen as the head of the new German
government for Sanna. Hempenstall describes him as being na distinct
departure from the usual German colonial official. Better educated than
the majority of his service colleagues, a man of the world familiar with
British colonial policy from his experience in India, solf felt
al together Slperior to the middle-class, nationalistic, somewhat
pettifogging German administrator. He brought to Samoa a natural respect
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for the intrinsic value of exotic cultures and a readiness to deal with
the Samoans on their own terms" (Hempenstall: 32).
During the first few months of his administration, he was besieged by
Samoan chiefs with inquiries about the status of the new government.
While waiting for his request to Berlin for the same information, Solf
created "virtue out of political necessity." He proclaimed the Kaiser to
be Tupua Sili, the highest chief, and himself as the Kaiser's
representative in Samoa. He announced the retairunent of: Mata' afa as the
paramount chief; the Faipule, or council of advisors; the European
jUdicial system. Shortly thereafter, he received a directory from the
Colonial Department in Berlin that he was accorded the responsibility
"to determine the manner in which the question of native administration
will be best solved while maintaining peace and order" (Hempenstall:
35) • The instructions permitted him a great deal of personal latitude to
arrange matters as he saw fit.
Solf envisioned a role for the Samoan leadership which lMJuld pursue
German colonial direction and rely upon legal precedent. He gave the
Samoan leadership the obligations of collecting taxes, supervising road
maintenance, cocoa planting, and jurisdiction over local and native law
and order. During the first year of his administration, he instituted
the poll tax, an ordinance requiring fifty coconuts to be planted on
unused land and formulated a disarmament strategy which netted about 500
weapons (Hempenstall: 35,36).
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The next several years, Solf had to deal with two rrajor threats to
his authority: Lauake Nanulau 'u, spokesrran for Savaii, and Richard
Deeken, founder of the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft (DSG). Lauaki, acting
as Mata' afa 's power broker, recognized Solf' s designs of subjection of
Mata' afa to the German regime. Secondly, the Malo, the traditional
Sarroan government, was upset with Solf' s removal of its responsibility
for financial affairs and the splitting of several traditional districts
into independent administrative units. Lauaki called a strike against
Schultz, Solf's deputy, while solf was away. solf's response was to
exile tw:> chiefs to Herberthohe in New Guinea while permitting Lauaki to
remain in order to keep the peace (Hempenstall: 36-38).
Deeken and his settler organization, DSG, became embittered over the
the relationship of Solf with the DHPG. In 1903 the members of the DSG
were in need of financial assistance to see their small plantations
through difficult times. solf was unwilling to aid the organization,
because Deeken wanted Samoans for servile labor and he disliked the pan-
Germanic philosophy of exploitation that the DSG held. A bitter battle
of VlOrds ensued and reached to Berlin through the influence of the
Pflanzerverein of Samoa. solf wanted Deeken removed from the island
while Deeken, through his connections in the Reichstag, derranded Solf' s
resignation and a strenghtening of the militia and suitable ordinances
for his fledgling DSG which was initially set to compete with the DHPG.
In 1904, Deeken overstepped the law for mistreatment of Chinese labor and
fraudulent activities. He was imprisoned temporarily in Germany and for
a time his opposition was mute.
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An outgrowth of the battle between the two men resulted in the
Faipule petition of June 1904. Seizing upon the strife of the European
camnunity, the Samoans again made several demands upon Solf's
administration. The Malo sought to influence decisions and review Solf's
policies and administration; it was an attempt to reassert the position
of the Faipule. Suspecting Lauaki and several other chiefs of being the
provacateurs, Solf called their bluff by requesting an apology, which he
received. Thereafter, the Samoan Malo hesitated to challenge Solf and he
went about his business without significant intervention by the chiefs
(Hempenstall: 42).
The Oloa Movement in 1904 was a spirited attempt by the Samoans to
reassert their influence, not by violence or aggression, but by means of
commerce. Pullack, a young half-caste son of a German customs official
promoted the idea of a cooperative, solely financed and managed by
Samoans, to compete with European plantations. Solf reacted negatively
to the scheme when he heard of the rumors of its formation. The whole
notion challenged the basis of the colony; in addition, he thought it
wouldn't work and considered it a stand of the Mulinu'u government
against his policies. In December of 1904, he took direct action to stop
the scheme by deportation of pUllack, by threatening officials of the
Mulinu 'u government with dismissal, and by putting pressure upon Lauaki
to assist with the keeping of peace and order. SoIf could not allow the
Oloa Movement to become institutionalized in the traditional Samoan
government (Hernpenstall: 44).
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Solf's attempt didn't terminate the Oloa Movement. While he was on a
visit to New Zealand, the Sarroans revived it, and sent a letter to the
Kaiser in January of 1905 complaining that Solf discriminated against
their corrrnercial initiative. Schultz jailed two active leaders, and by
the time solf arrived back, all internal strife had ceased. The Malo
avowed repentence, but Solf showed no appeasement (Herrpenstall: 46).
This time he threatened Lauaki with exile, abolished the House of Tumua,
reduced the institutional importance of districts and set up a new
salaried Faipule (Hempenstall: 47). Basically, solf meant to restore his
influence and break the power of the Mulinu'u government. In June 1905,
he issued orders that Mulinu 'u be vacated fran which had been sown the
seeds of discontent. Although he publicly ridiculed the chiefs at
LUfilufi, he did not sack Mata' afa, for he blamed their petition on
Deeken and members of the DSG for contriving the whole affair.
Lauaki emerged again in late 1908 as a considerable threat to solf's
government. With Mata'afa showing signs of senility and sickness, Lauaki
began to rekindle ambitions to reinstate the Samoan government. While
Lauaki was requesting Solf to reinstate the Faipule, Solf was actively
convincing chiefs not to go against his administration. The Pule
movement gained strength in 1909 with Lauaki at its head. The atmosphere
became very tense during that time. Settlers began preparing for war as
Lauaki continued his agitation from Savaii. solf telegraphed to Berlin
for military assistance, fearing an uprising. In mid-March, German ships
arrived with Marines aboard and blockaded Savaii. Solf called for Lauaki
to surrender himself and avoid military action and Lauaki did not resist
(Hempenstall: 61-64).
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Solf was anxious to avoid bloodshed, although he had used the threat
of force. He could have executed Lauaki for treason, but he chose to
send him into exile in Saipan, M:1riana Islands, with five other chiefs.
He proved to be very careful in his punishment of dissident villages,
also. Although he dismissed all their officials for twelve rronths, he
avoided the impression of engaging in a wholesale purge (Hempenstall: 64).
Solf again vented his anger on Deeken and his Pflanzerverein for
their supposed collusion in Lauaki's aborted attempt to reestablish
Sarroan chiefly influence. In response, Deeken petitioned the Colonial
Office and the Reichstag for an armed garrison, a naval vessel, and a
Melanesian police force to replace the Sarroan Fitifiti. Colonial.
Secretary Dernberg responded by inferring that the colonists wanted to be
absolute masters. Berlin refused to cooperate with the settlers for the
Berlin government had a real fear of Samoans as a formidable enemy and
was not interested in assuming a militant posture. Secretary Dernberg
informed the Reichstag that the Colonial Office would not support the
settlers' intentions. Thereafter, rrost of the Europeans backed Solf.
The British conSUl, Thomas Tread, paid the GOvernor his highest
compliment when he remarked that "even England could never have
guaranteed nine years peace in the group without the employment of human
repression" (Hempenstall: 67).
At the end of the decade, Solf ' s task was to resolve the issue of
succession after Mata I afa I s death. He did so by proclaiming that to
avoid any slight to the two "royal" lines, the Kaiser, the TUpu Sili,
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would abolish the Alii Sili upon Mata'afa's passing. Thereafter, the two
leaders would act as advisors to the Governor. Recognizing that there
might be some discontent with the arrangement, Berlin appropriated
40,000 marks for compensation to the people of Samoa (Hempenstall: 67).
So satisfied was Berlin with Solf's adTjnistration, that in 1911 he
became State Secretary of the Colonies. When solf left, Schlutz took
over and followed the same policies and approach Solf had used.
In summary, solf's policies were both sensitive to the island
culture, but sufficiently firm as to erode Samoan control of national
politics. He encouraged Samoan involvement in local affairs to draw away
their interests from national politics. It was clear that strong direct
rule was his intention and to some extent it was achieved, although it
was tempered by permissive local activities. He believed in development
with Samoans and through their traditional system, not in spite of them.
His methods were generally patient and non-militant. He did not believe
Samoans could or should be exploited ruthlessly.
Solf's rule was of service to the Samoans. He was able to create a
situation that avoided war and violence for his entire administration.
He regulated land sales in 1907, which disallowed further purchases for
plantation purposes. He would not allow Deeken and the DSG to achieve
their goal of a "master race" state; he protected the Samoans and the
Chinese laborers in the later years from the unscrupulous dealings of the
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Pflanzerverein (Moses, J. : 234-261). Above all, he proved himself a
masterful politician, as he was able to balance off Sarroan and Europeans
during a difficult period and won respect from both groups.
THE NEW GUINEA COMPANY AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE
After 1900, the New Guinea Corrpany was free to apply itself to the
business of business without concern for administering the protectorate,
which was now in the hands of Albert Hahl. Hahl left responsibility for
the economic development of the rrainland to the New Guinea Company and
intended to intercede on its behalf only in case of a breach of native
security. At the termination of the Charter, rapport between the Company
and natives of the Astrolabe Bay and Madang area was low. The Siar
openly rejected any notion of enforced labor for the purpose of either
clearing land or road building. Police troops had to be stationed nearby
before the Siar v.ould comply with Hahl' s orders to participate in road
construction (Hempenstall: 180).
It vasn' t until 1905 that government control in Friedrichshafen was
strong enough for the appointment of native administrators. Siar
resentment over enforced labor, land encroachment by the Company, the
troops nearby and the Rhenish Mission led to the Madang Revolt in 1904.
Hahl, realizing that it was as much the fault of Company pressure as that
of an unpacified people, extended direct rule to the area with the
organization of villages under the position of "luluai," which had been
utilized in the Bisrrarck Archipelago since 1897 (Moses, I.: 302). He
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realized that land acquisition was at the heart of the issue and
instructed the Company to survey the area, allow the natives access to
fishing areas and guarantee then dwelling places. Thereafter and until
1912, the Siar obeyed the government. The luluais found little support,
however, from the people and passive resistance was endemic (Hernpenstall:
184). In 1912, a plot to kill the Europeans was discovered. In
response, the German government convened a court of inquisition and
banished the accused groups from the area.
Elsewhere throughout the region, violence carried the day during the
middle of the first decade. The Wampar people had roved into the Lae
region and were preying upon the Lae people. In a set of attacks, more
than one-hundred of the latter were killed in 1907. The belligerence of
the Wampar had discouraged any development of the area and Hahl was
determined to put a stop to the lack of security. The four years from
1907 to 1911 marked a time of large punitive expeditions mounted by
government forces (Herrpenstall: 190). At that time, the Huon Gulf was
the only area on the mainland over which the government could claim to
have control. This was in part the result of the activities of the
Neuendettlesau Missions and also due to irrpressive shows of power by
expeditions •
ncn the mainland, north of the Huon peninsula, the nominal control
which the Germans claimed over the entire coastline amounted to little
more than a record of formal control and a thin veneer of direct rule.
The authority of the Reich was hardly acknowledged beyond the coastline
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enclaves of Europen settlement - Aitape, Potsdarnhofen, Monumbo and
Madang- and the immediate highlands" (Herrpenstall: 194). Warships often
remained an invaluable aid in the maintenance of security, for there were
many "flashpoints" in the whole of the protectorate. Some villages had
to be subdued by relentless engagements to quell native violence,
directed against both Europeans and other natives (Moses, 1.: 306). He
relied heavily upon his 1000 man police force, which was so inadequate
for the task that he could afford to divert only 100 newly outfitted
troops to the Ponapean rebellion in 1910. His plan for the future
included rrore of the same military pressure and forceful pacification.
"In 1914, relations on the mainland remained poised on a thin line
between an uneasy peace and open war" (Herrpenstall: 196).
Hahl, althought he was always faced with the belligerence of the
natives, also attempted social reforms. The government tried to curb the
excesses of the labor trade and ensure the voluntary recruitment of
laborers by enacting legislation in 1909. His" favorable treatment of
the natives in the courts aroused the indignation of the Europeans". By
1914, a portion of the natives of Kaiser Wilhelmsland had reached
accomodation with the government. Young men saw labor recruitment as
travel and excitment and as a means to acquire Western goods. Their
education was implemented by means of on-the-job training. Attempts were
also made to bring the natives into the rrodern European health system by
offering inexpensive services (Moses, I: 301).
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THE BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
Hahl returned to Herbertshohe in 1901 from ponape, where he as Deputy
Governor had administered the island government for a short time, to
assume the position of Governor of New Guinea and the Island Sphere.
Upon his return he enphasized policies tvhich he had formulated prior to
accepting his stewardship of the ponape government. He was convinced of
the need to pacify the natives in order to mobilize them for the
developing econonw. Violence by natives was regarded as tanamount to
acts of war, but violence was an inescapable component of colonialism.
He prefered to eliminate violence by sound administration, but was
prepared to use force when necessary (Hempenstall: 140).
As the New Guinea Company still operated plantations on mainland New
Guinea, Hahl sought to concentrate his development interests in the
Bismarck Archipelago where the outcome ~uld be rrore productive, leaving
the Company to open up the mainland. on the mainland, he would react
only under conditions of widespread unrest and then only by reprisal.
His first five years of administration emphasized attention to the
Gazelle peninsula of New Britain, northern New Ireland and Bouganville,
which were all depots for acquiring natives for plantation labor. Direct
rule based upon his luluai method was extended to these areas, also. A
District Officer was appointed to maintain surveillance and mobilize
natives for government tasks (Hempenstall: 141).
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His administrative innovations after 1901 included organized public
works and the imposition of a poll tax. He used the tax receipts to
construct roads. An instruction from him "authorized officials to co-opt
all able bodied men in the areas of control for up to four weeks to
assist in the construction and maintenance of roads, or to work on govern
ment p1a~tations" (Hempensta11: 142). So effective was the road progra~j
that the transportation network serviced all main villages. OCcassionally
resistance was encountered to the construction of roads, especially on
Bouganville island, but the attitude of the Tolai of the Gazelle
peninsula changed after 1900 because they were gaining better access for
their produce. However, they were opposed to the corvee, or enforced
labor. In exchange for their labor service, they willingly submitted to
a head tax of five Marks, collected by the lUluai, which Hahl instituted
in 1906 (Hempenstall: 142).
Land disputes with Europeans were a constant problem for Hahl. The
Europeans had acquired approximately 53,000 hectares of land but only had
10 percent of it under cultivation at the turn of the century. In 1902,
the Tolai were in possession of a dozen land reserves. "Hahl had to
fight plantation amers for every rretre where wholesale land alienation
had occured in Company days" (Hempenstall: 143). In 1902, Berlin gave
the Governors the authority to regulate conditions for European ownership
of land and to expropriate legally obtained land to insure to the natives
the possibility for an economic existence. OUtside of Hahl's control,
abuses could still occur. Hahl returned 5750 hectares of Queen Errnna I s
land in 1904 to the Tolai (Hempenstall: 141).
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"The last great Tolai war in the Gazelle penisula, in the Spring of
1902, can be traced directly to the orrnnissions of the German land
policy. " The killing of Rudolph Wolf, a German farmer, started from a
land-use dispute and perpetrated the war while Hahl was stricken by
fever. In retribution, Hahl's young magistrate and assistant, unleashed
2000 armed laborers, who were not Tolai and worked for plantation owners,
upon the Tolai villages. The act of violence re-kindled old intergroup
rivalries and fighting between natives continued until October. The
Colonial Office later described the incident as an "injudicious" decision
on the part of Hahl's administration (Hempenstall: 149-150).
On August 14, 1904, To Marias, a member of the Baining tribe, led a
massacre upon a mission in the Gazelle peninsula and Hahl sent an
expedition to arrest the guilty. He did not rrount an avengeful massacre
against the Baining as his subordinate had done against the Tolai, but he
did not show mercy. Fifteen of the Baining were killed in the resistance
and seven were hanged, while twenty were given long prison terms.
However, Hahl did corrmit one indiscretion. To Marias had been beheaded
during the fighting and his head was delivered to Hahl. Hahl shipped it
off to Freiburg university upon which the press in Germany "roundly"
condemned him (Hempenstall: 149-150).
In the years that followed the Baining Massacre, Hahl applied himself
to securing plantation areas and bringing areas without security under
the colonial umbrella. He was convinced from the exarrple of Kavieng' s
success as a trading station in the early 1900' s that secure areas made
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excellent stations for recruitment and that a show of government
perrranence \\QuId secure economic growth in the long run. His
pacification process was often bloody and arduous and truly secure areas
could be claimed only in the vicinity of the recruitment stations in New
Ireland and two large concerns in Bouganville. By 1914, his most
difficult task was t.liat of taIPing the Ma....ms people of the Adrriralty
group. Some headway had been made in their acceptance of German hegemony
when World War I occurred (Hempenstall: 152-158).
The German period closed with Hahl still Governor of Gerrran New
Guinea. OVer the course of twenty years in the area, Hahl developed a
set of policies that served various clientele. Albert Hahl 's
administration extended law and order and government supervision over the
protectorate. At the same time, he meant to bring the natives into the
governing system, at least by indirect means. The strategy to utilize
luluai was only partially effective, as many of the government's chosen
leaders were not traditional village leaders. Resistance was still
widespread outside of government "controlled" areas, where expeditionary
forces could only provide temporary security. His head tax did not
achieve its intended goal; on the contrary, it spurred native planting,
cultivation and marketing instead of indigenous work on plantations. On
occassions of violence, he responded quickly with reprisal. However, the
lessening of violence in the area was rrore attributable to missionary
work than to his policies and administration.
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With respect to Hahl' s treatment of the natives, it cannot be said
that Hahl was a personally brutal or callous individual, like von
Schleinitz or von Bennigsen. Although he reacted to native brutality in
the line of duty, he rust have worked diligently on the behalf of the
natives and for their fair treatment. He received disdain of European
planters for his opposition to indiscrirrdnate recruitment and its
injustices. He tried to stop the labor trade to Samoa, conducted by the
DHPG, a German firm. He fought for regUlation of labor recruitment and
he was concerned about depopulation, to the extent that he put embargos
on the "worked-out" areas to maintain native econorrdc activity. He had
to endure the planters' unceasing demands for labor, which ultimately
forced him in 1913 to renew the recruitment drive. He worked to restore
lands to islanders who had been displaced due to both legal and illegal
activities. Finally, because of his attempts to procure equitable
treatment for the inhabitants of New Guinea, he attracted the "contempt
and genuine animosity of many of the German planters"
(Hempenstall: 158-161).
GERMAN ADMINI STRATORS AND PONAPEAN ENT~LEMENTS
The sale of the Caroline and Mariana Islands to the German government
in 1899 marked the end of Spanish rule in the Pacific. Since the
mid-1600's, the Spanish had acquired an especially "nasty" reputation for
their record of brutality, subjection and near extinction of the Chammoro
peoples. Almost from the day of their arrival in ponape after pope Leo
XIII'S ruling in their favor, their presence in Ponape was
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scarred by violence and bloodshed. For most of their rule, the colonial
officials and supporting troops were prisoners in their own garrison at
Kolonia, living in fear of venturing into the ponapean hinterland. The
Spanish Governor must have been astonished at the sight of Albert Hahl's
"skeleton " crew that arrived to replace his troops. Noting that Hahl
only had a doctor, a harbor master, a police official and a mixed force
of forty-six Malays and Melanesians, the SPanish Governor urged Hahl "to
leave with him irranediately, lest his puny group be massacred with the
week" (Hempenstall: 81).
Hahl had known violence and bloodshed from his recent years as
Imperial Judge with the New Guinea COTl'pany and was aware of the recent
history of the SPanish in ponape. Neither he nor Berlin was interested
in provoking the islanders. Hahl's irranediate policy was "to let the
ground lie fallow for awhile" (Hempenstall: 80). Recklessness against
fighters seasoned for a decade would promptly spell the end of his
hapless crew. It v.Duld be a high price to pay for an area in which no
more than fifty Europeans resided at one time and that showed a rather
lackluster record for commerce as compared to other islands in the region.
His low-key approach belied his notions of policy for ponape, which
he entertained upon his arrival. "Hahl had drawn up a list of
objectives, centering on the curtailment of the powers of the High-
Chiefs, on balancing the interests of clans and on completely
restructuring indigenous land rights" (Hempenstall: 81). In short, he
intended nothing less than the destruction of the feudal system of Ponape.
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However, in the first rronths, he stressed preservation of the Ponapean
system, freedan of religion, protection of individual property rights,
but played down economic and social change because he considered the
situation still volatile, as a result of the Spanish era. He set up a
system of indirect rule out of necessity, not design. "The High-Chiefs
were delegated local judicial powers in minor civil and criminal matters,
while important cases affecting the districts were left to the Deputy
Governor, in "concert with the Chiefs" (Hempenstall: 82).
Hahl's administration of Ponape was shortened by his appointment to
the position of Governor of New Guinea and the Island Sphere. Victor
Berg, a colonial servant in German East Africa replaced him. Hahl left
feeling frustrated for he had not been able to gain ponapean trust. It
would be left for Berg to nake them "loyal servants of the Gernan
Empire." Berg's initial policy was to forcefully assert Imperial
authority and to meet resistance with reprisals. However, Berlin thought
otherwise: he was told not to provoke unrest or problems. His term,
thereafter, was one of "restraint and sobriety" (Hempenstall: 82).
When Hahl departed for New Guinea, he left with Berg the
responsibility to disarm the Islanders who had acquired a considerable
stash of weapons. Berg began by implementing Hahl's disarmament policy
in Truk where he collected over 400 weapons in three rronths by offering
payment. Berg was later able to capitalize on the destructive typhoon of
April, 1905 to acquire some of the ponapean weapons. In return for each
weapon, he offered meat and rice or 35 Deutsche Marks which the ponapeans
-83-
could use to purchase food during the famine which followed the typhoon.
The arrival of a German warship about the same time soured the feelings
of ponapeans, for it was rumored that the Germans would now turn upon
them (Hempenstall: 84).
'Ihe situation was looking up for Berg until the German Capuchins,
Catholic missionaries in replacement of the spanish, arrived and began to
prosyletize in the northern districts of Ponape. The Protestant church
had held sway in southern ponape as a result of the work of the American
Board of Foreign Missions which began its w:::>rk in the mid-1800's.
"Religion over the years had become a powerful reinforcement of political
sudivisions. The complexion of one's faith was now a badge of political
allegiance: the Catholic North against the Protestant South. " Berg,
although pressed by his Catholic countrYmen, w:::>uld not sanction their
request to move into the southern districts, for he needed the support of
Henry Nanpei, "The Protestant Church" in the southern districts and a
powerful political figure. Relations with the Catholic Capuchins were
strained until Berg I s untimely death in 1907. His death also coincided
with the change in the Colonial Department and Dernburg's desire to see
the Colonies become self-sufficient (Hempenstall: 85).
Albert Hahl, now Governor of New Guinea and overseer of the Island
SPlere, returned to ponape in the interim and managed to shake up the
Ponapean chiefs by announcing the Reich's decision to convert the present
conmmal land tenure system, which was under the control of the chiefs,
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to a freehold system with individual ownership of parcels of land under
the control of commoners acting as homestead tenants. Hahl left soon
after with the islanders confused and rurroring serious changes in the
ponapean social and land tenure system. In 1908, George Fritz came to
Ponape in replacement of Berg. He was the previous District
Administrator of the Mariana Islands and had been relatively successful
in a number of social and development programs (Hempenstall: 87). Fritz
was an official in the true colonial sense of the word.
Fritz's immediate actions were to introduce a levy of personal taxes,
the imposition of corvee labor, and the implementation of Hahl' s policy
of a change in the ponapean land tenure and ownership system. However,
he modified Hahl's original plans, claiming that it was essentually not
workable. Instead of abolishing the absolute right of the chief over the
carnnoner's land, the chief would receive a monetary compensation. The
tenants would be obliged to work for government on projects for fifteen
days of each year for one Mark per day, of which half would go to the
chief as compensation. The government would retain the other half. The
chiefs would become the supervisors of the project and sometime
administrator of local affairs. It was a "subtly disquised system of
mass taxation and corvee labour, designed, at one stroke, to reduce the
independence of the chiefs and involve them rrore closely in adrninistra-
tive control, to accustom the people to ordered work and to open up the
island at minimal cost" (Hempenstall: 89). The system could only work
with the chiefs' sUpPOrt and willingness to cooperate.
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By the summer of 1908, Hahl and Fritz had just about convinced the
Colonial Office that the scheme would work, when ponapean politics began
to interfere with their plans. Henry Nanpei had become embroiled in a
land succession dispute with another chief, Sou KitL Sou Kiti could
draw support fran the northern chiefs and by late surrnner of 1908, the
near ~,e brink of warfare. Fritz ~~fortunately "es not
attuned to the complexities of the political affair, and soon found
himself deep in the middle. <:nce rrore, it appeared that he was on the
side of Nanpei and the Protestant South. Indeed, he was in open conflict
with the Capuchin missionaries who had taken the role of mediator for the
northern districts (Hempenstall: 93-94).
Out of fear and an interest in quelling any possible uprising, Fritz
called in two German cruisers and 200 Melanesian troops in the fall of
1908 to soften a desparate situation. In order to cornplete his road
project, he instituted armed patrols. Convinced that they were in a
state-of-seige, both he and Hahl requested a peace keeping force from the
Colonial Office, which would insure that all reforms were carried out. A
naval vessel, 200 soldiers and cornpletion of a network of roads were the
prerequisites they envisaged. Fritz also asked for an extra fiscal grant
of 40,000 Marks over two years to offset the cost of constructing the
roads with paid voluntary labor, since the planned public corvee was
momentarily oot of the question. Berlin began to consider withdrawing
the German government to Truk, but Hahl was against the move. He advised
that Ponape rrust be pacified in order to avoid ramifications spreading
throughout the Island Sphere (Hempenstall: 95-96). As a result, Dernburg
accepted Hahl's opinion, but turned down the peace keeping force idea.
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Fritz was transfered to Yap unexpectedly in October of 1909. His
"incipient systan of close Irrperial control seemed to have been dealt a
damaging blow, and the success of his innovation was very doubtful"
(Herrpenstall: 98). His demotion was largely the result of his
mishandling of the protestant-Catholic dispute, the latter having good
friends and strong support in the Center party of the Reichstag.
Fritz's replacement, Carl Boeder a demanding authoritarian-,
arrived in December of 1909 from Dar-es-Salam. He arrived with the
conviction "that the rod was a legitimate and effective method of
instilling colonial discipline," and he began his administration in a
forceful rranner. He set about to corrplete the work of his "weak"
predeccessor by forcing the corvee upon the islanders, and the Sokehs
chiefs, in particular, to accept Fritz's innovations. In fact, he
doubled their work period because of their previous resistance against
corvee labor and land reforms. By April 1910, he had installed
compulsory labor to build a road around the island. The chiefs were
SUbsequently upset that they had lost their right to performance of
duties by the commoners, their corrpensation, and their ability to
influence island affairs. The ponapean people "found themselves
subjected to a new and distasteful regime" and resented Boeder's methods
(Herrpenstall: 100).
By May of 1910, there was a definite groundswell of opposition
against Boeder. The chiefs and commoners wanted to withdraw from the
corvee system, but Boeder would not permit it. Most persistent in their
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opposition were the Sokehs people. When Boeder left the island in July,
a rumor circulated of a Sokehs revolt. Upon his return, he called in a
German cruiser to show the power of the German regime. Surprisingly,
Boeder did not punish anyone; he opened the ship to show the potential
destructive power of the German military. In retrospect, it may have
been the only wise tactic he had pursued in ponape.
Things went from bad to v,orse for Boeder. When no ships were in
port, the ponapean road workers demanded a raise. "Boeder refused,
threatened the High Chief (of Sokehs) with deportation and threw him
bodily out of the office" (Hempenstall: 102). Fram that day onward,
Boeder's days were numbered. To make matters v,orse, he instituted
corporal punishment for those ponapeans who disobeyed orders.
The breaking point came on 17 October 1910 when Boeder administered a
beating of a Sokehs youth, one of the High Chief's own. Soumadau, the
chief and leader of revolts against the Spanish, was determined to obtain
retribution. In the days that followed, the Sokehs people would rise in
rebellion against the German regime. &:>eder, for all his intransigence
and cruelty, was murdered by Soumadau. One could infer from the events
related here that Boeder only received what he deserved. But what about
the Sokehs people? The future seemed already clear to Soumadau: the
southeast corner of Nan Madol - a stone wall of an ancient religous
village and area signifying the spirit of the Sokehs people - had
recently fallen, signalling the end of the Sokehs people (Ehrlich: 190).
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The prophecy was fulfilled, in addition to the hanging of the
ringleaders, over 400 men, women and children were sent into exile, at
first, to Yap and then a few to Palau to l,<K)rk in the phosphate mines of
Anguar, where conditions were harsh (Hempenstall: 118).
with the Sokehs affair at an end, Germany's presence in the islands
had but three years to run. Boeder was succeeded by Heinrich Kersting,
who led the German forces against the rebellious Sokehs. Unlike Boeder,
Kersting "showed every sign of respecting the sensibilities of the island
PeOple, and he combined an authoritative presence with syrrpathy for the
plight of pacific Islanders under the German Rule" (Hempenstall: 113).
Kersting took his job seriously, and reasserted the priorities of Hahl
and Fritz. His accomplishmentsd were:
-comfidssions were charged with establishing limits on
homesteads, erecting boundaries and making maps of the
island districts;
-issuance of land regulations that provided land would go
to the oldest male heir of the tenant; and
-promulgation of regulations in 1911 which gave the chiefs
power to try and sentence people guilty of minor offenses.
Author's note:
As this paper is meant to review policy and policy determining
actions, a full description of the Sokehs Rebellion has not been
included. It should be noted, however, that the German response,
directed by Kersting, to the Rebellion involved the use of marines
as land forces and the bombardment of the Sokehs stronghold by
German warships. For further information, refer to the writings of
Peter Hempenstall or Paul Ehrlich.
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It was not his intention to destroy the power or influence of the
Nahmwarkis (High Chiefs), rather he institutionalized them in the
administrative system. "Kersting protected the ponapean system to some
extent. Islanders were made aware that their autonomy and economic
freedom did not elimina. te the duty of submission to customary social
sanctions or to lawful demands of the High Chief" (Hempenstal1: 114-115).
For the remaining years the ponapeans were outwardly "pacified."
Henry Nanpei and Kersting were involved in checking the influence of the
capuchins in the South, because Kersting disliked their approach to
education. He planned to put island education under the direction of the
Reich, but due to the coming of World War I, this never materialized.
THE CAROLINE AND MARIANA ISLANDS
The Caroline and Mariana Islands were declared a protectorate by the
German government and put under control of Imperial Governor von
Bennigsen on October 13, 1899. Yap, Palau and the Mariana Islands except
Guam, which had become a united States Territory, were administered as
sub-districts of the Island Sphere and adrift of central administration
until they came under the jurisdiction of the Vice Governor at ponape in
1903.
The first District Officer in Yap, Arno Senfft, arrived in 1901 and
mediately established a government based upon the structure of the
SPanish system. Over-chiefs were designated for eight Yapese districts,
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and each village in the district was represented by a president, who
reported to the district over-chief. Monthly meetings were held to
convey communications to the villages from the center, Colonia (McKinney:
76). Senfft was also charged with the control of the Palau Islands. He
set up the sane kind of indirect system as he used throughout Yap and a
negro by the name of Gibbons; who had spent time there, was chosen to
represent his government in his absence from Palau (McKinney: 79).
Achievements during these first years in Yap were primarily the
construction of roads and a causeway, and the maintenance of peaceful
relations with the Yapese. Apparently, Senft had no trouble with
violence, in comparison with ponape, because he dismissed the Melanesian
police force which he brought with him and built a force composed of
policemen from each district (McKinney: 77,78). The only event that may
have tarnished his record was the uprising of the "Kalis" or sorcerers in
Palau. The uprising had its origins in the closing of the men's houses
and the attempt by the German administration to discredit the Kalis and
terminate the payment of tribute to them by the PeOple of Palau. Not a
shot was fired, but six of the Kalis were banished to Yap for several
years (McKinney: 79).
Senfft made an effort during the first years of his administration to
foster a coconut planting program, due to the weakness of the cash
econo~ in the area. To oversee the planting, he initiated a system of
inspection by his police officers. The laying of the telegraph cable,
from Yap to Guam with connections to the Shantung Peninsula in China, was
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an undertaking which was to spur development in the region. Although it
was a major event, prosperity was short-lived and Colonia, which had been
impacted rrost by the flurry of activity, returned to its economic slunp
(McKinney: 83) •
The Mariana Islands TlJere adrpinistered at first by District Office,
George Fritz. Like his colleague in Yap, Fritz also established his
government along the lines of the Spanish system. The lowest level of
representation was at the village level with an elected mayor and an
assistant. The islands were organized into districts and villages were
placed under the jurisdiction of an indigenous district "overseer" who
was responsible to Fritz.
Fritz wasted no time in exerting his control over the r~riana
Islands. He instituted a head tax, work tax and slaughter tax on cattle
and hogs, the latter having its antecedent in the Spanish period. The
work tax or head tax could be paid or substituted with labor on
governmental projects; the head tax represented three Marks or six days
of work annually; the work tax was graduated depending upon age and
marital status (McKinney: 84-85).
Fritz experienced little trouble with the Charnorros and Carolinians,
both indigenous ethnic groups, as they had long been "pacified" by the
Spanish conquistadors and mission. His police force of Malays was soon
dispatched to New Guinea and he used local men for the purpose. This was
possible because the sale of guns and liquor had been forbidden from
early in his administration (McKinney: 85).
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Noting that the Mariana Islands "had the greatest potential for
economic growth and the poorest iIlUTlediate econoIT¥," he set out to
introduce changes (l1cKinney: 87) • His programs were rrostly in the
agricultural sector. His administration sponsored coconut planting and
instituted an ordinance requiring not less that one-quarter acre of land
to be planted for garden crops. Having been fo~ally trained in forestry
and agriculture, he established an experimental farm. Unfortuneately,
none of this had any lasting effect upon the econorrw, as the typhoon of
1905 destroyed all crops (McKinney: 88,89).
Fritz's most enduring achievement was the establishment of compulsory
education for children fran the ages of six through twelve. This was a
departure from policy throughout the German Pacific, as the Catholic and
Protestant missions had been organizing and delivering educational
services (McKinney: 91). In order to populate the islands, which had most
of the population removed to Guam by the Spanish, Fritz sanctioned
settlement by both Germans and other Islanders from Micronesia. Where
islands were devastated by typhoons, Fritz moved the people to Saipan
(McKinney: 88).
The period from 1899 to 1906 was relatively uneventful. German
business was trying to rest econanic control of the Mariana and Western
Caroline Islands from the Americans and Japanese, but the effort was
indecisive. Throughout the period, the area remained nominally under the
control of the New Guinea Governor and Vice-Governor in ponape, and it
was seldan that either interfered with District Officers.
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THE JALUIT GESELLSCHAFr IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
The period between first German settlement in the Marshall Islands
and annexation was peaceful and without native resistance, in contrast to
either New Guinea or Sanna. Adolf Capelle, agent for Stapenhorst and
Hoffschlager, established trading stations in 1860. He was followed by
Franz Hernsheim, of Robertson and Hernsheim in 1877, when the latter set
up a "factory" in the islands. A year later, and about the time Bismarck
authorized commercial compacts throughout the pacific, Captain von Werner
of the German Navy concluded a treaty with Chief Kabua of the Ralik chain
of the Marshall Islands. Eight years later in 1885, Lieutennent Raettger
claimed a protectorate over the entire Marshall Islands in the name of
the German Empire (McKinney: 11-14). Chief Kabua and four other chiefs
signed the treaty accepting protectorate status. They agreed that the
Marshall Islands would "henceforth be under the protection of the German
Empire and that none of the chiefs were to enter on their own into
negotiation with any other power (Hezel: 358). The AnglO/German
Agreement of 1886 confirmed a demarcation of the two powers' colonial and
economic interests in the Pacific and Germany's acquistions were
completed with the addition of Nauru in April, 1888.
Initially, the administration of the Marshall Islands was placed in
the hands of the Jaluit Gesellschaft. Bismarck put his slogan, "THE FLAG
FOLLOW) TRADE," into operation as he had promised the Reichstag in 1884
(Townsend: 124). The Jaluit Gesellschaft was organized through the
unification of the Deutsche Handels-and Plantagengesellschaft in Sanna
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and the Hersheims, and administered as a Micronesian section of the
DHPG. The firm, however, never received the "Schutzbrief," or full
standing and sovereignty in colonial affairs, enjoyed by the New Guinea
Company (Townsend: 150). It had the right to conduct business and hold
unclaimed land, but the political administration of the Marshall Islands
Protectorate was lodged in the position of the Imperial Commissar and his
Deputy Secretary, appointed by the Colonial Office. Appointment to these
two positions were to be approved by the Reichs Chancellor. The Jaluit
Gesellschaft had some measure of influence, however, because laws and
ordinances were not to be instituted or carried out without consultation
with the management of the firm (McKinney: 18).
The instructions to the Imperial Commissar in 1886 authorized him "to
issue whatever ordinances he should deem necessary on general
administration, customs and taxes, and punishment for violations. The
authority he held for punitive actions were a declaration of maximum
imprisonment for three months, fines and confiscation of individual items
for disobedience of police orders" (McKinney: 22). Taxation, by which
the administration was to be supported, was somewhat complex. It was
different for natives and Whites, with taxes of the former to be paid in
kind, the latter in money (McKinney: 28). The Commissar used the native
chiefs to carry out local administration and to collect taxes (McKinney:
30) • The Commissar was also responsible for setting up a system of
justice; issuing laws directly or indirectly affecting the natives; and
making laws governing land issues, labor and contracts (McKinney: 37).
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Shortly after the beginning of the Protectorate (1887), an ordinance
was issued which forbade the purchase of land from natives by foreigners,
which also applied to the rights or privileges to the use of the land.
It protected natives and provided the Jaluit Gesellschaft with a monopoly
over trade. In 1890, the ordinance was supplemented with another
forbidding ~~e settlement of traders on land belonging to p~tives without
an agreement recognized by the Commissar. Thereafter, trading was
restricted to those already in business (McKinney: 22, 23).
Matters that proved difficult in other areas within the German
Colonial Empire were resolved without resistance in the Marshalls. An
ordinance in 1886 was issued forbidding the sale, gift or transferral of
firearms and ammunition to natives. Furthermore in 1898, the chiefs
sUH?Qrted an order to collect outstanding weapons. Missionary activity
in the early years of German rule created animosity between the
administration and the missionaries. Later they came to an understanding
and by 1900 were on good terms. The missionaries provided education and
health services, directly benefiting both the administration and
islanders. Only a minor wage dispute by the Islanders ruffled the even
course of the administration during the period from 1901 to 1906.
From 1885 to 1900, the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Marshall Islands
developed in a peaceful manner, unlike the Samoas and New Guinea. The
Gesellschaft report for 1900 read, "on Jaluit itself, a monotonous life
prevails. This is helped along by complete lack of singing birds and
aninals, so that only the roaring of the seas, the rush of the sudden
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rain pouring down with great force, and the thundering of the surf
against the coral reefs interrupt the deathlike quiet" (McKinney: 17).
The Gesellschaft's growth over the period was only slightly more
exciting. It expanded with Chiefs profiting, but the record was in no
respect startling.
In terms of economic success over the years, the Gesellschaft' s
history was mixed. The year 1901 saw the Jaluit Gesellschaft buying out
the last of its corrpetitors. The Pacific Islands Corrpany was made a
supplier, under contract, to the Gesellschaft and the number of its
trading stations was reduced. on the other hand, from 1903 to 1905, the
firm experienced heavy competition from Australian entrepreneurs. To
coonter the financial success and influence of the Australians, the
Gesellschaft invoked prohibitive taxes against the foreign firms. In
response, the British government challenged the Kaiser on the impostion
of restrictions. Just previously, the corrpany eXPerienced a major
financial setback due to the devastating June 1905 hurricane. Had it not
been for the profits the company had taken from Nauru's phosphate, these
two events could have spelled financial disaster for the firm.
In 1906, the Kaiser ended the Charter of the Jaluit Gesellschaft.
The Marshall Islands Protectorate was put under the jurisdiction of the
Island Sphere, where it occupied the same status as the Eastern and
Western Carolines - Ponape and Truk, Yap and Palau - and the Mariana
Islands government.
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THE ISLAND SPHERE AND AN INTEGRATED COLONIAL POLICY
The reorganization of the Colonial Department in Berlin at mid-decade
also affected the structure of the government in Micronesia. In April of
1906, the Jaluit Company was divested of any further administrative
control over the ~arshall Islands. Control was tra~sfered to the
Herbertshohe government in German New Guinea. Five years later, the
Jaluit District Office was reduced to station status and the Marshalls
and Nauru were put under the control of the Vice-Governor of Ponape.
saipan had previously been reduced to a comparable status in 1907 and the
administration of the Mariana Islands then carne under the jurisdiction of
the Yap District Officer. In 1911, two Districts were redefined: the
Eastern Carolines - Truk, ponape, Kusaie and the non-Carolinian areas of
Nauru and the Marshall Islands; and the Western Carolines - Yap, Palau
and the Mariana Islands (McKinney: 128-130).
Dernburg's directive that the government offices of the colonies
should find their own support prompted Hahl to centralize and unify the
financial system. Throughout the Island Sphere, a head tax was
instituted of 40 Marks on non-natives, with variation in assessment upon
natives, dependent on their status. The collection of the taxes was left
to the District Officers. All previous taxes in force prior to
unification in 1909 were abolished. In addition, import and export
tariffs, which were utilized in all colonial territories of the Empire,
were applied to the pacific territories by Berlin.
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Because Dernburg wanted the colonies to be financially independent,
the Herbertshohe administration placed its emphasis upon economic
development. phosphate rights were given to the pacific phosphate
Company of London for Nauru and the Deutsche Sudsee Aktien Gesellschaft
for the Anguar mine in 1909. The Hanseatische sudsee syndikat obtained
the 1!1ining rights to Fais in ~J]e Carolines. Hahl ~s particularly
interested in reducing the influence of the JaPanese trading firm of
Murayama in the Mariana Islands. He was also concerned with the
challenge of Burns-Philp, an Australian firm, to the financial viability
of the Jaluit Gesellschaft in the Marshalls (McKinney: 114-118) •
Finally, agriculutural development was emphasized; specialists were sent
from Berlin; disease eradication was attempted; and training was
initiated in agriculture techniques.
The government began to give more attention to the problems
experienced by the natives. In some cases, population redistribution was
necessary because of uninhabitable atolls after the destructive typhoons
of 1905 through 1907, when deaths were in the hundreds (Hezel: 419).
Carolinians were moved to Saipan and the south islands of the Palau
group. Mortlockese were sent to the Truk Lagoon and ponape. Senfft, in
particular, thought the movement of Carolinians would help to break the
feudal systan in the Yap area, which required the sending of surplUS
tribute to the main island of Yap annually. The population
redistribution was stopped by 1914, and later most of the Islanders were
either repatriated or found their way back to their home (McKinney: 107).
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Regulation of the labor trade also received attention. Ordinances in
1906 restricted term employment to only within Micronesia, and then only
with the permission of the Governor; definite contracts were required;
and approval of native officials was needed. These regulations were
skirted, however, during the labor unrest at the Anguar phosphate mines
in 1910, when the manage~nt faced difficulties because of disobedience
from the Micronesian employees. District Officer Fritz called attention
to the problem and would not support the firm, since it failed to live up
to contract expectations. That is, goods were paid instead of wages,
there were frequent whippings, and penalties were put on the staff by the
German rranagement. In the end, Fritz was replaced by an Officer who
would support the firm .and its labor requests, and the phosphate
Gesellschaft was able to find its requisite of labor from the exiled men
of Sokehs (Hezel: 422-423). This incident reiterated the importance of




INTERNATIONAL GERMAN COLONIAL POLICY
'!he literature search and the resulting text have defined the events
that led to the drive for German colonies in the Pacific and revealed the
policies which the German government and its administrators pursued. It
should be apparent that one ought not generalize about German
colonization and the measures used to effect Imperial rule throughout the
pacific. While the acquisition of territory and the administration of
one island group my have been peacefully implemented, other areas
experienced civil strife and anarchy. In another respect, it is unclear
whether the German participants or the German government and its
representatives had formulated well defined policies in advance or their
actions and activities were determined by native response to colonization.
With regard to initial colonization, it is yet unclear whether the
actions of Bismarck after 1879 were intended or they developed from
pressures throughout the early 1880's. We should like to know, haw much
was planned and how nuch came by accident. Q1.e thing may be said of
Bismarck; he was a clever man. He allowed others to speak and be
criticized while he roved cautiously. The actions and words of Caprivi
and Kaiser Wilhelm II speak for themselves. Caprivi was willing to give
up territory for peace and security, while the Kaiser could risk the
Empire with his "childish bluster." Nonetheless, none of these men were
totally responsible for Germany's colonial history or the events which
transpired.
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The German merchants, e. g •, Weber and the Hernsheims, although they
were not singulary responsible for formulating colonial policy in the
Pacific, may be said to have significantly influenced the outcome of
events in their respective areas. Their indifference to any nation that
claimErl protection over the islands was short-lived. Weber proposed
goverrurent backed colonization as early as 1870, and it was only a little
more than a decade later that his German consuls petitioned Bismarck for
annexation. Their actions in Samoa were based upon a need to control the
Samoan anarchy and a genuine fear that the New Zealanders and
Australians, who were becoming increasingly vocal and anti-German, ~uld
ultimately drive them out of business. Therefore, it may be generally
said that Germany's Cesire for territory in Sarna resulted from
corrunercial issues and not from a desire for "settlement colonialism" or
miss ionization.
Alternatively, the acqusition of New Guinea was the outgrowth of a
deliberate policy of intended agricultural and land exploitation together
with a grand scheme for colonization. Its formulation was rooted in the
desires of Berlin bankers, like von Hansemann, to establish a network of
healthy trade throughout the Pacific. Their interests in colonization,
however, found no sympathy with the Reichstag in the early 1880's, for it
was the Reichstag that ~uld ultimately finance their endeavors.
Their most effective alternative was to throw their weight behind
Bismarck in an alliance of big business and big agriculture. TO
cultivate the relationship between big business and Bismarck's Reich,
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Bismarck appointed von KusserCM as his Colonial Advisor. That
relationship was not only fundmental for enterprising businessmen, but it
was also based upon familial ties, as von Kusserow and von Hansemann were
brothers-in-law.
'Ihe German consuls, with the assistance of Weber in Sarroa, played a
role in colonization. All, except Zembsch, were politically motivated to
advance the cause of Germany. For the rrost part, they were businessmen.
Both Hernsheims, with businesses in the Marshall Islands and the Bismarck
Archipelago, assurred the position of consul before their businesses were
absorbed into the DHPG and the Jaluit Gesellschaft. Based upon this
knowledge, one rray reason that Bismarck received less than objective
information fran his consuls. On the other hand, he was often at odds
with his consuls in Sarroa, but this does not rrean that he was
unsympathetic to their desires or actions. Stuebel, for all his
intrigues, 'Was allowed to remain, while Zembsch, who questioned German
presence and activities was dismissed.
The role of the colonial societies in Germany during the Bismarck era
and after should not be over-emphasized. Although they were able to
stimulate the desire for colonization, they were not in the position to
direct policy. For much of the thirty years of German Colonial Empire,
their activities ~re an embellishment for the rrovement. OCcasionally,
as in 1906, they fulfilled an important role in arrousing public
sentirrent for colonial developrrent. But on the whole, their attitudes
and the social and economic groups from which they drew their base were
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philosophically and politically opposed to the men in political power,
and it is unlikely that they YtDuld have been permitted a significant
voice in policy determination. The manner in which Solf and Dernburg
exposed Deek and the Pan-German Pflanzerverein serves as an example.
In retrospect, it is safe to say that the Reichstag, of all interests
not directly associated with Bismarck or the Kaiser, was most influential
in determining the course of colonial development in the Empire.
Although there was no one powerful party that possessed enough political
clout to control events, there remained a balance anong parties in the
Reichstag which contrived to hold colonial issues and development as
secondary concerns. However, it cannot be said that the parties within
the Reichstag were adamantly against colonial growth. 011y during the
early 1900 's does one find strong resistance to colonies, and this had
arisen from poor rranagement in Africa. As a result, von Bulow was faced
with a Reichstag that intended to maintain a close watch over territories
and a tight reign on their purse. But it was not significantly different
for either Bismarck or Caprivi; neither were interested in going up
against the Reichstag and one should not discount the power that this
parliament held over its Imperial administration.
Missionization in the Pacific played a significant role in the
restructuring of indigenous government during the 19th century. To a
certain extent missionaries influenced the earliest constitutional
government in Samoa in the early 1870' s. But, on the whole, missionary
-104-
activity was relegated to caring for the religous needs of the Islanders
in the German flag territories. The decisiveness of the German traders
and the swiftness by which they acted toward the Islanders is a reason
for a diminished influence of the missionaries in the protectorates, and
the general dislike of missionaries and their institutions, on the part
of the German administrators, kept the missionaries out of the mainstream
of politics for the most part. The missionaries' collaboration in the
Ponapean entanglement should be considered an anomaly. Their overall
position with respect to political influence at the local level was weak,
because their numbers were few. In Germany the central religious
societies seemed to put little effort into the pacific. Their heavy
politicing was predominantly slanted toward Africa or based upon national
politics, and their moral platforms were often in opposition to the
Chancellors. Therefore, the missionaries never achieved the predominance
in local affairs that occurred, for example, in Hawaii.
In surrmary, the timing by which territory was taken or put off had
much to do with the groups heretofore discussed. The partition of the
Pacific Islands in 1884 and 1885 was in many respects due to the
relationship between Bismarck and his aids, and their relationship with
others. Von Hansemann's ability to obtain territory in New Guinea can be
directly tied to his relationship with von Kusserow, his brother-in-law
and Bismarck's personal counselor a1 colonial issues. Weber and von
KusserCM were also proteges, and it was von Kusserow who kept Bismarck
informed of activities in Sarroa. In the same manner, Herbert Bismarck,
the Chancellor's son, had cultivated a strong personal relationship with
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Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister of England. It was Herbert Bismarck
who performed the negotiations for partition of the Pacific Islands for
his father. Therefore, it appears that Bismarck kept policy making
fairly close to the chest, trusting the rrost sensitive issues to his
closest advisors and son. Based on this knowledge, it would appear that
the Chancellor's intentions were not merely a matter of coincidence with
other diverging colonial interests. It is conceivable that the
acquisition of territory was a well-disguised plan, unknown to all but
his closest aids.
How rruch of Bismarck's actions were opportunistic and how much was
manipulated or spelled out in advance has been the topic of historians
for the Past century. As noted, a number of interest groups were party
to the initiation of the Colonial Empire. Hoisting the flag over New
Guinea was tantamount to filling a void which otherwise would have been
filled by the Australians. He had a willing partner in von Hansemann,
who could take the financial risk. Bismarck was able to capitalize on
French indifference and he had courted the British who needed Bismarck as
much as Bismarck needed them.
sarroa turned out to be something of a rotten apple for Bismarck, and
Weber later. The dismissal of von Kusserow in 1885 may have been born
out of von Kusserow's support for Weber and Stuebel's coup. It obviously
had the potential of disrupting the negotiations with the British. But
one ITUst wonder how Oskar Stuebel could have risen to the position of
Director of the Colonial Department in the beginning of the 1900's
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without the backing of the Chancellor. It is certainly possible that
Bismarck's repudiation of his consuls' declarations of protection in
Samoa were merely a smoke screen to disguise his colonial aspirations.
'!he acquisition of the Ma.rshalls v.;ere shown to be a matter of
corrnnercial determinism. It had not taken long, from 1875 to 1885, for
the islands to be settled by German traders and subsequently to have been
put under the umbrella of the Jaluit Gesellschaft and the Reich. The
Hernsheims, at the head of the Jaluit Gesellschaft, never had to deal
with a theory of development; they experienced no opposition or
unsettling activities. The Caroline and Ma.riana Islands v.;ere acquired
adroitly by the Kaiser. He purchased the islands before they could be
traded away to the united states by spain.
INTERNAL GERMAN COLONIAL POLICY
It is easier to assess German colonial policy after establishment of
Imperial rule in the pacific; one does not get "caught up" with the
synister intent of the policy and there is a distinction between locally
made decisions and those of the central office in Berlin. Prior to 1906
the Colonial Department left much of the local decisions to the Governors
of the protectorates. After Dernhurg reorganized the Colonial Department
and it was elevated to the status of a Ministry, Berlin paid closer
attention to local details, and in some respects unitized its colonial
system of administration throughout its African and Pacific territories.
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Law and order, upon analysis, was probably the most sought after goal
of the colonial administrators. The search for peaceful conditions was a
recurrent theme during the German era in the Pacific. The first official
policies in all the protectorates forbade the sale of weapons or
armaments and arranunition to the Islanders. Secondly, disarmament of the
Islanders was implemented as quickly as possible. Third, a police force
was either established with local individuals or they were staffed by
Malays.
In the case of native rebellions, the administrators used a variety
of tactics to defeat or to bring to justice those who were deemed
responsible for misdeeds. In New Guinea, ponape and SalIDa resistance was
met by expeditions of land forces, generally comprised of other Pacific
Islanders and German marines. Where it was inefficient to apply land
forces or when the government sought to show its enormous strength and
power, the Imperial Navy in conjunction with the local administration
would authorize the bombardment of shoreline villages. Punishment was
meted au t by rreans of bannishment from the area, exile to penal camps,
sentencing in local jails, or capital punishment in front of a firing
squad or hanging.
In the later years of the Empire, after Dernberg, the government took
direct responsibility for the development of the islands. prior to 1906,
the prevailing philosophy was to let business take care of development.
Thereafter, the local government and the Berlin central government
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applied itself to both social and economic development. Education was
left in mission hands except in the Mariana Islands, but plans were being
made to shift education to government responsibility. Hospitals and
disease control were addressed in the last five years of the Empire and
there was an attempt to provide services to the Islanders.
Economic development prior to Dernberg was mainly the concern of the
companies, but he issued a directive in 1906 that all protectorates make
themselves self-sufficient. Whereupon, there was a greater push to
develop infrastructure, i.e., roads, wharfs, and markets. In order to
finance these ventures, a head tax was required of all inhabitants of the
Empire. Where taxes were not collected by local leaders, corvee labor was
emphasized to create the needed infrastructure.
Labor reform laws were formulated as a result of the problems
experienced in the African colonies. Both Hahl and Solf explicitly made
an attempt to protect the Islanders from unscrupulous labor practices.
The laborers were further protected by labor laws initiated by Berlin in
the latter part of the first decade of 1900.
Land regulation was initiated early in the 1900 's in both Samoa and
German New Guinea. Regulation was primarily designed to curb the results
of the land speculation of the late 19th century. Attempts by both
administrations were made at that time to return land to its rightful
owners and the regulation was followed by court adjudication. Of all the
policies of the German administrators, these were the most successful.
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It would appear that the attempt to break the powers of the native
chiefs was of paramount interest to both Solf and Hahl, and all of their
colonial underlings throughout the German Colonial Empire. They roved
quickly to establish direct rule over the area, while employing various
methods to weaken the power of the chiefs. At the same time they sought
to bring them into the administration of the government at the local
level by offering positions which required the administration of justice
by and for the Islanders. It was a form of appeasement and a means to
stabilize relations. Later, Dernberg expressed the Colonial Ministry's
desire for "selbsverwaltung" for the Empire in the Pacific.
Finally, the nature of German rule in the Pacific must be viewed in
the context of the German administrators and their policies. Whatever





GERMAN INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH SEA.
A Collection '-if Documents presented to tIle G/:!'rman Reichstag m FelJ7·ua7-Y, 1885.
A B S T R ACT S.
No. l.-HETIn A. 7GX HANSE~rANN TO PRINCE BISMARCK.
Berlin, No,,". 11, ~SS().-Herr A. ,on Hansemann, Chairman of the German
:Harine Commercial Company (Seehandlungs-Gesellschaft), now in liquidation,
forwards a memoir of his company's board of directors, prepared by the request of
'Pri?ce Bismarck, conveyed in a note dated :Hay 7, 1880. He forwards the memoir,
which proposes:-
1. Tllat ~Iioko, on the Duke of York Island, a coaling port of the German
na-vy, he made the centre of future Colonial efforts.
2. That :In Imperi:tl suhsidy be g-ranted to a line of steamers which a
consOliiul11 of the commercinl firms now established there are prepared to
start, ~nd wllich 'would connect lIIioko and Apia, Tont,ratahn, and other
places having German fxetolies.
3. That coaling st.1.tiolls he secured along the north-east 'coast of New Guinea,
hetween the East Cape and long·. 1410 E., 'where the commercial finns
interested ",ould establish £1.ctories.
:: TIle memOi7" rife1"1"ed to above -is not printed.)
No. 2.-COUi'\T VON LDI13URG-STIRUlII ON A COl\VERSATIO~ 'WITH
HERR VON HANSEI\fANN, ON FEB. 15, 1881.
Jlft:nwmndum.-Prince Bismarck, after the rejection of his propositions
respecting S~ll1oa, (hy the Reichstag), ooes not consider it eXl~dient~ ~ake any steps
in the direction pointt>o out hy Herr yon Hallsemalln. A GoYernment, not cordially
l)acked by the nation, could not accept the co-operation of commercial firms in the way
indicated. The ,ote on the Smuoa, Bill Lad shown that a large majority of the people's
represent.1.ti \'e5 took no interest in this question. . .
Goycrnment, looking to the attitude of the ReicLstag, could not occupy ten-i-
tories in the South Sea. This would lJa,e to be left to priyate enterprise. At the
same time, Go,ernment would extend its protection, mn-al and consular, to propertJ' in
land acquired by private adventurers. .
-1l2-
"
No. 22.-DR. STUEBEL TO PHIXCE DIS:JIARCK.
Apin, June 17, 1884.-1 learn from ~ telegram in the Amtr:11ian papers th:1t
Lord Derby is prep~\1·ed to tnke possession of New Guinea if the colonies nrc will iIJfr to
be:lr p:1rt of the expense. . ."
. I beg to state that:l step of thi.c; kind ,,"oulJ sr..'ions]y end;lllger Gcrm:m interests
III the South Sen.. There, too, islands not yet t'1ken possession of, are being
scramhled for. This process may be debyed for a time, hut C:ln neyer he m:1dc
retrogressive. Delay is of use only to Engbnd :lnd her colonies. The assurances of
the London Cabinet may lle honest enough, hut e,ellts will override them. Out here,
eyeryhody, from the highest official to the slllallest tradesman, works at tLe 3I1g]i-
c.anisation of the whole Pacific, 'without t'lking the least notice of these· assur:mces.
Germany must not trnst to them, unless I;he is prepared to face one Jay accomplished
~~ .
The Samoa Islands l)y themselyes would not sufficiently justify an active colonial
policy of Germ:l1lv ill the South Sea, :dthouo-h we defend from them our commercial •
position in Tonga"and ill the Rc:tttered islm~s to the north. But e\"en Samoa would
become a forlom hope, unless we succeed in maintaining our footing in New Britain.
Politically, as well ns geogrnphicnIly, the north const of New Guinea forms part of Xew
Britain. The arguments applied hy England to the south coast of New Guinea. and to
Torres Strnit, apply with equal forcp-, from a Germa!l point of view, to the north-east
cost and DampierStrait..
English interests in Xew Guinea are limited to tLe south coast. Germall
interests in Xe",' DI"it'1in dem:1I1d thnt Ellgbnd llc excluded from the north coast.
The exten:;ion of German commercial enterprise to that const is merely a question
of time. H.1d it not heen for the Joss of tlie .Mioko, the German Commercial and
Plantation Compn.ny would hefore this ha\"e est:lhlished itself there. It is desirable
that otller Germ:ln cnpitnlists should assist in the conquest of this coast. A territory
like that of the archipelago of New Britain, including the north coa.st at' New Guinea,
would indeed he an ohject worthy of German colonia.l ent.erprise. Bounded by the
Dutch Indies this territory would not he exposed to suffocation from surrounding
English colonies, :llld would afford us menus to hold Samoa, commercially as well ns
politic.a1ly.
This is the very tIling Engbnd desires to prevent by '"t~ ~o\ementill our fbnk,
and the danger likely to arise, if England is allowed :.0 oc~_:_\:---:::-'"e north coast of Kew
Guinea, is very serious indeed.
England mny take the whole of the south CO?s1:, but ifme north coa:;t, from tIle
Enst Cape to long. 141 0 E., f..'llls into the hands of a foreign p0v;-er, our interests would
be seriously jeopardised.
:No. 23.-CQUNT 1t.rUNSTER TO PRIXCE B1S~fARCK.
London, August 9, 1884.-1 hnxe informed Lord Gram·ille of our desire to
arri\"e at an enrl}' understanding with reference to the South Sea. -
Lord Gram-me listened to me ,~ith interest. He declnred that England was
not jealous of Germnn colonial enterprise, and that he "as aware that Germany
possessed important interests in several of the South Sea Islands. The English
Government was desirous to define the limits within "hich the influence of either
country was preponuel"3ting. As regarued New Guinea, he said it was news to
him that Gerul:lll interests existed there. Confidentially he added that the negotia-
tions hetween the home Government nnd the colonies, about the annexation of
Xo. 36. P'
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No. 19.-HERR VON HAJ.'\SEMANN AND BARON BLEICHRODER TO
PRINCE BISMARCK.
Berlin, June 27, 1884.-The German l.farine Commercial Company (See
Hanuels-Gesellschaft), hayill~ gone into liquidation, owing to the rejection by the
Reichstag of the S:unoa Bill, it has become our task, not merely to reorganise the
German Commercial and Plantation Company, but also to pursue the original aims
of that Company in a different mode. .
The plan submitted to your Excellency in 1880, with reference to a South Sea
enterprise on a larger scale, could not be realised.
The first steps for resuming this enterprise had been taken when the Queens-
land Government, in April, 1883, took possession of New Guinea and the adjacent
islands, and some months ago they were resUl.'1ed.
. Our undertaking is to be carried on in accordance with the principles laid down
by your Excellency in a recent debate of the Reichstag, as entitling it to a claim to
the protection of the German GO"fernment.. '
As far as the lJublic is concerned, our undertaking will be an expedition fitted
out 1Jy the German Commercial and Plantation Society of Hamburg, with a view to
founding 3dditional factories, as in the ordin:lry course of business, in the Western
Pacific. In pm"suit of this object an agreement has been entered into between the
Company and a Society, specially founded for the. expedition, and consisting of
Messrs. , with the undersigned as managing directors. .
The German Commercial and Plantation Society bas purchased a steamer for
the purposes of the e....pedition at Sydney, which will take tbe name of Sal1wa, and
sail under the German flag. .
Dr. Finsch, of Bremen, bas been entrusted with the com.rnand of the expedition,
and has already started, accompanied hy Captain Dallmann, of Bremen, and a few
picked ~ailors. Dr. Finsch will ostensibly take a passage in the trading vessel
Samoa on a scientific cruise.
Dr. Finsch and Captain Dallmann are charged toe.:q>lore the coasts, to seek
out the best harhours, to establish friendly relations mth :the natives, to found
factories (for wbich purpose officers of the Commercicl...and Plantation Company
are on board), :md to make extensive purcba~es of land.. -The land thus acquired,
together with that already in the possession of the Cc-=~ny, are to fomI a solid
foundation for a colony in the Western Pacific.
The labour trade ought not to be permitted. rAJ iI:.\"acle these new German
settlements, as the command of labour will give tbe:n an advantage over other
islands in the South Sea as well as over Queensland. The Commercial and
Plantation Company has, consequently, bound itself to engage no labourers
for Samoa.
Mioko is intended to T}ecome the central point of these settJeu';ents. Dr.
Finsch and Captain Dallmann are instructed to conceal their object, and to examine,
first of all, the southern part of New Britain and the north-east eoast of New
Guinea as far as 141 0 E. They are on no account to visit the south-east coast of
New Gninea or Torres Strait.
We beg your Excellency to accord protection to this enterprise, and more
especially to instruct consul3I officers and comm:lllders of war to register the land
purchases to he made.
-ll!..-
I\O. 21.-TELEGRA:\1 TO THE GER~[AN CO~SUL-GEi\Er..AL,SYDNEY.
[Derlin] August 19, IS84.
Inform Imperial Commissioner Yon OeIizen in New Brit~il1-
Tllnt it is inten(leu to' hoist tIle German fbg ill the nrdlip~bg'o of Ke,v
Dritain anu along that part of the north-east CU:l.st of New Gninen.
which lies ontside the spIlere of interests of Holland :l.nd Engb.nd,
where German scttlclllents :1lrcady exist, or arc in course of
forlll:-,tion; and-
'flInt he is anthorised to snpport pnrc1l:lses of bnd hy Geml:llls :mil to
1'('gister tIle agreements made, ,\-ithout prcjlHlice to third parties.
-----------------
No. 25.-l'HE\CE BISJL\.HCK TO HERR YON HANSEMANN A~D
HERR VOX BLEICI-IP.ODER.
Vanin, Augllst 20, 1881.--Instructiolls Ila\"e been gin·n to snpport yonl"
'l'I!lt-rt:d,iug'. The aC(l'li ..;itions 1lI:1I1e hy .you \rill he placcd under tk~ }lmtcdioll of
tIle EIlll'ire, 011 the same conditions as in S(lutll-western :\frica, snhjeet to the





CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GER~L~N EMPIRE AND SAMOA.
No\ember 11, t884.
In order to secure to the Ge11uan residents of Samoa the benefits of a (Tood
government, and in execution of Art. VII. of the Treaty of Amity het,rccn Gen~:lllY
and Samoa, of January 24, 1879, the Imperial Actin(r Cousul for the South Sea Islauds
on the one hand, and the King, the Vice-King, and the Gonrnment of Samoa have
agreed to the following stipulations:-
ART. I.-A GenTIan-Samoan Council of Stat~ shall be created. Of this CouDcil
there shall be memb~rs:-The German Consul or his representati\e; two Samoans,
one to be nomiIlllted by the King, the other to be nomUlate<1 oy we vlCe-..I\.lDg, In
concert with the Taimua and the Faipule; and two Germaus, to be nominated by the
German Consul.
ART. IT.-The GerIM.n-Samoan Council of State is to discuss and adopt such
laws and institution as lDay be to the mutual benefit of the S:lmoaus amI of Germans
resilling in Samoa. It will more' especially b)" down legal regulations with reference
to such puui:,hnble acts on the part of Samoaus which affect injurioll5ly a German, or
a subject of some other state in the sen;ce of a German, or a coloured labourer in the
service of a German, or the property of any such pet'son. The same regulations are
to be applied to punishnble acts committed by coloured labourers in the service of a
German.
ART. HI.-The regulations laid down by the German-SalDoan Council of State
will be signet! by the Kiner and Vice-King, and mnde law. In the preillIlble it is to be
stated that the bw is pub~isbed after having been detennined upon by the Gennan-
Samoan Council of State.
ART. IV.-The King) in concert with the German Consul, "'Will nominate a
German official of the Samoan Government. This official "ill act as secretary nnd
adviser of the King in all affairs which affect Germans residing in Samoa. He will
exercise the office of a German judge in all offences in 'which Germ:los residing in
Samoa are interested, and which do not inyolve a sentence of oyer two years' hard I
labour. He will also, conjointly with a Samoan judge, act in cases where Samoans
and coloured labourers guilty of having iujured Samoans or their property are
concerned; and he sole judge where offences against coloured bbourers have been
committed by coloured labourers. Offences involving more than two years' hard
labour v.;ll be judged by the German Cousul (or by a person appoiote.9. by him) and
by a Samoa.n jtld~e. -
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AltT. V.--A prison w1ll be built for the confinement of offelH.l~rs who have
COllllllittCll offence:) ill 'I"hich Germans rcsiclent in Sanloa are interested. Offenders
COlllil'lfIned to ltanllahonl" sllall be suitahly ciiipJoj'ed, nnd the produce of tbeir In.honr
may l,e 11eyoted to cOH~ring of the expenses of auministration. The German official of
tlle SalllClan Government shall ha'ie the sllpt:rintentleuce of this pri~O~l.
AI:T. VI.-The King, in concert with the German Consul, will :tppoint policemen,
,,-110 511aU he cmployed in the plison service, and in the Jn~intenance of security on
Cerrnau p1n.ntations. These policemen shall he under the orders of the Germnn official
uf tIle S:L1110an Government.
AUT. VIr.-The expenses arising from this Convention slla11 l)e covered by court
fees, f1np~, the pro(lllce of the wod.;: done by prisoners: and by taxes to be levied upon
tlle Ct:nn:tns interested.
A representative of the Germnn ratepayers 511n11 he entrusted with the
:!dlllilli~trn.tiun of these moneys. The Gerl1l:m-S:uIIO:l.n Council of State will fix the
l:ltl'S, :ts well as the expenses.
AltT. V1 II.--TJlis Com.-e!lton, suhjeet to the l':lrific.1.tion oftlJe Imperial German
COVernllH.-nt, i;; to come into force :1.t Ollce. As 10n~ ns it has not heen ratified, payruent
of taxes sh:\Jl not he d~I:1:1nljet.i. The Imperial German Government shall have the
rirrllt to <rive six months' 11O..-ice or tbe tcrmiuation of this Convention.
o "
In proof of this we 11:~ ..e hereunto set Ol\l" se:tls.





(Signed) WEBEn, as ,,;toess.
(Sign ed) ~IALI ETDA,
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The Berlin Association for the
Centralization of Emigration and
Colonization
The Central Union of German
Industrialists
The Central Association for Commercial
Geography and German Interests in
Foreign Countries
The Small Journal
The German Commercial and Plantation
Company
The German Colonial Society
The German Empire's Advertiser
The German-Samoa Company
The German Sea Trading Company
The German South Seas Joint-Stock
Company




The Society for German Colonization
The Hansieatic South Sea syndicate
a ruling class of the Prussian state






















pertains to Bismarck's internal social
struggles in the Reichstag
The National Association for German
Emigration and Settlement





pertains to a philosophy of
international policy
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